



THE CITY OF NEW YORK
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER
BRAD LANDER



JUMAANE D. WILLIAMS

August 19, 2025

The Honorable Eric Adams
Mayor
City Hall
New York, NY 10007

Re: Urgent Concerns Regarding OIG-NYPD Staffing and Oversight Capacity

Dear Mayor Adams,

The Office of the Comptroller is committed to providing transparency and oversight of City agencies to promote integrity, strengthen public trust, enable effective assessment, and identify opportunities to improve municipal operations to better serve New Yorkers. Similarly, the Office of the Public Advocate investigates complaints about city services, advocates for systemic reforms, and protects New Yorkers' civil rights. Given these complementary oversight mandates, our offices share a direct interest in the independence and capacity of the Office of the Inspector General for the NYPD (OIG-NYPD).

In the spirit of accountability, we are writing to raise serious concerns about the sharp staffing decline at the OIG-NYPD, a critical oversight body within the Department of Investigation (DOI). As members of the City Council at the time, we co-sponsored Local Law 70 of 2013, which created the OIG-NYPD with the goal of empowering an independent office to scrutinize NYPD policies, practices, and procedures, particularly where civil rights and liberties are concerned. That mission remains as vital today as it was at the time of the office's founding.

When OIG-NYPD was first authorized in 2014, it had 43 budgeted positions and was projected to reach \$3.8 million in personnel expenditures. In 2017, the office reached its peak staffing level of 37. By July 2025, the total filled headcount for OIG-NYPD had dropped to just 5, with salaries totaling \$703,674 annually. As of August 2025, information provided to our offices indicates that number declined even further to **just 3 filled positions**.

With only three positions filled, OIG-NYPD's capacity to conduct independent investigations and issue timely findings has been severely undermined. This is the direct result of sustained underfunding and staffing cuts by the Adams administration, compounded by DOI's failure to keep the agency adequately staffed. The office's output has also been sharply reduced — in 2017 with 37 individuals on staff, OIG-NYPD averaged four substantive, non-legally required reports annually; by 2024 that number had fallen to just one. The table below illustrates the disproportionate cuts to OIG-NYPD compared to DOI overall.

	OIG-NYPD		Department of Investigation	
	<i>FY 2022</i>	<i>FY 2026</i>	<i>FY 2022</i>	<i>FY 2026</i>
Budgeted Headcount	39	20	400	267
Actual Headcount	19	5	301	244
Full Time Budget	\$3,363,171	\$3,278,769	\$31,166,446	\$26,225,520
Estimated Salaries	\$1,474,689	\$703,674	\$25,072,338	\$25,939,280

OIG-NYPD, which operates within DOI, has faced far steeper cuts than the agency overall. Since January 2022, DOI’s budgeted headcount dropped by 33% and its filled headcount by 18.9%, with its budget reduced from \$31.67 million to \$26.2 million. Over the same period, OIG-NYPD saw a 49% cut to budgeted headcount and an 84.2% drop in filled positions. These disproportionate reductions reflect decisions made at both the Adams administration and DOI leadership level. Meanwhile, DOI’s Executive Management budget code grew—its filled headcount increasing from 10 to 16 and annualized spending doubling from \$1.3 million to \$2.6 million, with average salaries rising from \$133,982 to \$165,525.

Despite these significant staffing and resource reductions, DOI recently issued a [posting](#) for a “Co-Inspector General, working as one of two Co-Inspectors General” for the OIG-NYPD. Local Law 70 of 2013, which created the OIG-NYPD, refers to “an individual who is to carry out the duties” to investigate, review, study, audit, and make recommendations relating to the operations, policies, programs, and practices of the NYPD. The law did not contemplate a dual-leadership structure, particularly at a time when the office is operating with its lowest staffing level on record. In the context of severe attrition and cuts under your administration, and DOI’s failure to restore positions, creating a co-leadership model risks diverting resources away from rebuilding OIG-NYPD’s investigative capacity.

In addition to the staffing concerns raised above, a review of the adopted budget for DOI raises concerns related to the OIG-NYPD’s Other Than Personal Budget (OTPS). The budget lists \$17.8 million for land, buildings, and structures within OIG-NYPD’s OTPS, which equals 84% of OIG-NYPD’s total budget yet funds DOI-wide lease obligations rather than OIG-NYPD program costs. Because OIG-NYPD’s work is primarily personnel-driven, such a high OTPS share suggests agency-wide facility costs may be allocated to the unit, potentially crowding out hiring and investigative capacity.

To better understand the current situation and inform future oversight efforts, we respectfully request your response to the following questions:

- 1) What accounts for the sharp decline in filled positions at OIG-NYPD since January 2022, and why has the office experienced a higher attrition rate than other DOI inspector general offices?
- 2) What steps has DOI taken to recruit, onboard, and retain staff within OIG-NYPD?
- 3) What is the purpose of establishing a “Co-Inspector General” model, and how does that structure align with the office’s current staffing level?

- 4) Does DOI plan to restore or expand the number of filled and budgeted positions for OIG-NYPD in future budget cycles?
- 5) How does DOI determine what constitutes an appropriate number of budgeted positions for OIG-NYPD in relation to the size and complexity of the NYPD?
- 6) What accounts for the sharp decline in OIG-NYPD's discretionary reporting output in 2024?
- 7) What justification is there for charging \$17.8 million in DOI-wide lease costs for land, buildings, and structures to OIG-NYPD's OTPS? What steps and timeline, if any, will DOI use to reprogram these costs to an appropriate cost center to avoid crowding out OIG-NYPD's personnel?

The massive underfunding of OIG-NYPD makes clear that structural reform may be urgently needed. The Council's Commission to Strengthen Local Democracy is already considering a 2026 ballot proposal to codify DOI's budget as a fixed percentage of the City's total expense budget, similar to the Civilian Complaint Review Board's (CCRB) structure. Under the City Charter, CCRB staffing is set at 0.65% of NYPD's uniformed headcount, ensuring its capacity grows and contracts in direct proportion to the size of the NYPD. The precipitous decline of staff at OIG-NYPD makes clear that a similar reform is urgently needed. I have copied members of the Charter Revision Commission on this letter and intend to engage them in conversations about how to ensure OIG-NYPD is safeguarded within DOI as they finalize ballot language for 2026.

We look forward to working with you, DOI leadership, and members of the Charter Revision Commission to ensure that OIG-NYPD receives the staffing and resources necessary to fulfill the mission envisioned when the office was created. The independence and strength of this oversight function are essential to building public trust and ensuring accountability in policing. Please acknowledge receipt of this letter by August 22, 2025 and provide a formal response to these requests no later than September 1, 2025.

Sincerely,



Brad Lander
New York City Comptroller



Jumaane D. Williams
New York City Public Advocate

CC: Charter Revision Commission