

AUDIT REPORT



CITY OF NEW YORK
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER
BUREAU OF FINANCIAL AUDIT
WILLIAM C. THOMPSON, JR., COMPTROLLER

Audit Report on the Development and Implementation of the Police Department's Domestic Violence Tracking System

7A02-150

SEPTEMBER 9, 2002

*The City of New York
Office of the Comptroller
Bureau of Financial Audit
EDP Audit Division*

**Audit Report on the
Development and Implementation
Of the Police Department's
Domestic Violence Tracking System**

7A02-150

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Background

In 1994, the Mayor created the Commission to Combat Family Violence to ensure that government agencies and other organizations work together to effectively address and respond to domestic violence. Currently, 75 of the City's 76 police precincts have officers and investigators who deal specifically with domestic violence incidents and its prevention.

The NYPD hired Information Builders Inc. (IBI) in 1998 to upgrade its existing FoxPro application at a cost of \$1,170,770. The FoxPro system handled 500,000 Domestic Violence cases, but FoxPro did not allow each precinct to view the cases of all other precincts. IBI upgraded FoxPro to a centralized database known as the Domestic Violence Tracking System (DVTS). DVTS is an online, Internet-accessed system that is designed to assist NYPD officers in effectively addressing and responding to domestic violence situations by capturing information from Domestic Violence Incident Reports.

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Our audit objectives were to determine whether the NYPD followed a structured methodology when it upgraded its FoxPro application to create the DVTS system, whether DVTS allows for future enhancements and upgrades, and whether DVTS meets user needs and whether users are satisfied with the system.

Our fieldwork was conducted from March 2002 to June 2002. We reviewed and analyzed DVTS, including: task orders; project documentation; financial documentation; satisfaction reports and acceptance and completion documentation; user reports, user listings, and a user guide. In addition, we interviewed NYPD officials, verified whether the system met specifications, and conducted a user satisfaction survey.

We used the Comptroller's Internal Control and Accountability Directive 18, *Guidelines for the Management, Protection and Control of Agency Information and Information Processing Systems* (Directive 18), as the criterion for this audit. As the City does not have a formal System Development Methodology, we also used the National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication #500-233, *A Framework for the Development and Assurance of High Integrity Software* (NIST), to assess whether a system development methodology had been followed.

The audit was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards (GAGAS) and included tests of the records and other auditing procedures considered necessary. This audit was performed in accordance with the City Comptroller's audit responsibilities as set forth in Chapter 5, § 93, of the New York City Charter.

Results in Brief

DVTS allows for future enhancements and periodic upgrades. However, our user satisfaction survey indicated that approximately 80 percent of users who responded to our survey would like to see changes made to the system. In addition, all needed components of the system were not provided or developed. Further, the NYPD did not have an independent quality assurance individual throughout the development of DVTS. Finally, the NYPD does not ensure that inactive users are eliminated from the system, nor does it have a complete, formally approved Disaster Recovery Plan for DVTS.

Recommendations

The audit resulted in six recommendations, which are listed below.

The NYPD should:

- Ensure that IBI completes and meets all requirements according to contract terms. The NYPD should also ensure that tasks assigned to its project members are completed.
- Obtain a quality assurance individual to review future system changes and enhancements.
- Meet with system users to ensure that the problems identified in this report are resolved.
- Develop formal security policies and procedures for DVTS that comply with Directive 18.
- Eliminate inactive users, as required by Directive 18.
- Develop a formal Disaster Recovery Plan for DVTS and ensure that it is tested in accordance with Directive 18.

Agency Response

The matters covered in this report were discussed with officials from the NYPD during and at the conclusion of this audit. A preliminary draft was sent to NYPD officials and discussed at an exit conference held on June 18, 2002. On June 19, 2002, we submitted a draft report to NYPD officials with a request for comments. We received a written response from the NYPD on July 3, 2002. The NYPD agreed with the audit's six recommendations, stating that it had already been addressing the matters contained in four recommendations before the audit began and that it would implement the two remaining recommendations.

The full text of the NYPD comments is included as an addendum to this report.

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ADDENDUM - Agency Response

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INTRODUCTION

Background

The New York City Police Department (NYPD) protects lives and property; responds to emergency calls; investigates reported crimes; apprehends violators; and deals with conditions that affect the quality of life in the City. The NYPD also responds to emergencies and disasters; keeps order at public events, demonstrations, and civil disturbances; intervenes in family disputes; refers people in distress to appropriate social service agencies; and works in partnership with communities to prevent crime.

In 1994, the Mayor created the Commission to Combat Family Violence to ensure that government agencies and other organizations work together to effectively address and respond to domestic violence. In an attempt to improve investigations, increase arrests, and enhance support services for victims, the NYPD deployed a "Combating Domestic Violence Team" in 32 precincts. Currently, 75 of the City's 76 police precincts have officers and investigators who deal specifically with domestic violence incidents and its prevention.

The NYPD hired Information Builders Inc. (IBI) in 1998 to upgrade its existing FoxPro application at a cost of \$1,170,770. At that time, the FoxPro system handled 500,000 Domestic Violence cases, but the system did not allow each precinct to view the cases of all other precincts. The result of the upgrade was a centralized database known as the Domestic Violence Tracking System (DVTS). DVTS is an online, Internet-accessed system that is designed to assist NYPD officers in effectively addressing and responding to domestic violence situations by capturing information from Domestic Violence Incident Reports.

Objectives

Our audit objectives were to determine whether:

- The NYPD followed a structured methodology when it upgraded its FoxPro application and created the DVTS system;
- DVTS allows for future enhancements and upgrades; and
- DVTS meets user needs and whether users are satisfied with the system.

Scope and Methodology

Our fieldwork was conducted from March 2002 to June 2002. To achieve our objectives we reviewed and analyzed:

- task orders defining deliverables and estimated project costs;
- the DVTS requirements document;
- DVTS technical documentation;
- purchase orders and voucher information;
- financial status reports;
- the current user privilege report;
- the current user list;
- system satisfaction reports and acceptance and completion documentation; and
- the *Domestic Violence User Guide*.

In addition, we interviewed NYPD officials, verified whether the system met specifications, and conducted a user satisfaction survey.¹

We used the Comptroller's Internal Control and Accountability Directive 18, *Guidelines for the Management, Protection and Control of Agency Information and Information Processing Systems* (Directive 18), as the criterion for this audit. As the City does not have a formal System Development Methodology, we also used the National Institute of Standards and

¹ We originally selected 45 users to complete our user satisfaction survey. However, NYPD informed us that five of these users were invalid. Therefore, our sample was reduced to 40 users, 15 of whom responded.

Technology Special Publication #500-233, *A Framework for the Development and Assurance of High Integrity Software* (NIST), to assess whether a system development methodology had been followed.

The audit was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards (GAGAS) and included tests of the records and other auditing procedures considered necessary. This audit was performed in accordance with the City Comptroller's audit responsibilities as set forth in Chapter 5, § 93, of the New York City Charter.

Agency Response

The matters covered in this report were discussed with officials from the NYPD during and at the conclusion of this audit. A preliminary draft was sent to NYPD officials and discussed at an exit conference held on June 18, 2002. On June 19, 2002, we submitted a draft report to NYPD officials with a request for comments. We received a written response from the NYPD on July 3, 2002. The NYPD agreed with the audit's six recommendations, stating that it had already been addressing the matters contained in four recommendations before the audit began and that it would implement the two remaining recommendations.

The full text of the NYPD comments is included as an addendum to this report.

OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER NEW YORK CITY

DATE FILED: September 9, 2002

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

DVTS allows for future enhancements and periodic upgrades. However, our user satisfaction survey indicated that approximately 80 percent of users who responded to our survey would like to see changes made to the system to make it more user-friendly and to provide needed reporting features. In addition, the methodology used by the NYPD in the creation of DVTS did not ensure that all needed components of the system were provided or developed. Had the NYPD used an independent quality assurance individual, these problems could have been identified and resolved during the development of the system. Finally, the NYPD does not ensure that inactive users are eliminated from the system, and it does not have a complete, formally approved Disaster Recovery Plan for the system.

System Development Methodology

The NYPD did not employ a formal system development methodology when it developed DVTS. Instead, the NYPD “task orders” defined the segments of the project. Directive 18 states that following “a formal system development methodology to manage the development process” can help “insure the success of system development projects.” Because the NYPD did not use a formal system development methodology, certain important components that were needed by the system, or that were related to it, were not provided or developed. For example, although the task orders included a requirement to link the NYPD with the Department of Probation (DOP), this requirement was not met. As another example, the task orders required that DVTS include a centrally located database containing Order of Protection information; again this was not provided. As a final example, DVTS was to support daily data comparison capabilities specifically for DOP; it does not.

Table I, following, lists the DVTS system requirements and their implementation status.

Table I

DVTS Requirements

Requirements	Delivered
Include a centrally located database containing Domestic Incident Reports (DIR) that has remote access for data capture, query requests and management reporting.	Yes
Include a centrally located database containing Order of Protection (OOP) information that has remote access for data capture, query requests, and management reporting.	No
Provide calls to the NYPD phonetic search module as an aid in identifying potential suspects and/or victims from internal and/or external databases.	Yes
Provide reporting and data extraction capabilities specifically for the Department of Probation (DOP).	No
Allow for printed forms, as specified by the requirements of the DIR case-tracking process.	Yes
Setup a network link between DOP and the NYPD.	No
Extract all active probation cases, excluding warrants, youthful offenders, and juvenile offenders from the DOP database and create a file to support the initial upload to the NYPD database.	No
Modify an existing database trigger to perform a scheduled upload of DOP information directly into the NYPD database over the network link every 24 hours.	No
Modify the DIR application to search the DOP database and create a record for each match. (Using the New York State Identification [NYSID] number of a probationer or a possible match on non-NYSID information, such as SSN, name, and date of birth). Each record would be transferred back to the DOP database.	No
Modify the DOP's application to create a screen listing all possible match records. (Using NYSID number or non-NYSID matched on name and date of birth).	Yes
Modify DOP's application to create a screen to detail all domestic violence information on the record selected from the list screen.	Yes
Modify DOP's application to create a screen option to generate a report listing all NYSID notifications and up to 10 non-NYSID notifications.	Yes
Modify DOP's application for printing the report containing the daily hit records received from the NYPD at DOP borough office local printers.	No
Include a centrally located database containing DIR that has remote access for data capture, query requests, and management reporting.	Yes
Access centrally located databases containing OOP information that have remote access for data capture and reports.	No
Respect the sensitive nature of the above data by requiring that there be access as needed, and traceable to each remote workstation and user.	Yes
Support daily data comparison capabilities specifically for DOP.	No
Allow for sufficient form-printing to meet the requirements of the DIR case tracking process.	Yes

The NYPD accepted the system and paid IBI \$1,165,720 of the \$1,170,770 contracted despite the fact that IBI did not deliver nine out of 18 requirements. Further, we could not determine whether IBI provided to the NYPD the required architecture and communications assessment, the system document outline, and the DOP's detailed code specification.

Lack of an Independent Quality Assurance Individual

Although the NYPD contracted in June 1999 with Deloitte and Touche Consulting (Deloitte) to monitor the DVTS development, the NYPD ended the contract in May 2000, when IBI had completed approximately 70 percent of DVTS's development. No individual was hired to take Deloitte's place in providing independent quality assurance. Therefore, IBI and the NYPD continued developing the system without the benefit of quality assurance. Directive 18, § 9.5.1, states that engaging "an independent quality assurance consultant to assist the agency monitor and review the work of the development and integration team" can help "insure the success of system development projects." A quality assurance individual could have detected and then solved the problems noted above.

User Satisfaction Survey

Our user satisfaction survey² revealed that only 47 percent of users reported that the DVTS's reporting features meet their needs. In addition, the survey disclosed that:

- 53 percent of the users reported that accessing DVTS often results in work delays;
- 40 percent of the users reported that they encounter delays when entering data in DVTS;
- 73 percent of the users stated that the system is occasionally inaccurate and contains duplicate reports;
- 47 percent of the users reported that DVTS is not user-friendly; and
- 80 percent of the users stated that they would like to see changes made to DVTS.

² The survey results are based on responses from 15 of 45 sampled DVTS users, as of June 3, 2002.

OTHER ISSUES

System Security Standards

The NYPD has not developed formal security procedures for DVTS. According to the NYPD's MISD Technical Director, access to DVTS should be terminated for any user who has not used the system for 180 days. However, a review of the NYPD User List revealed that 1,693 (79%) out of the 2,137 user-IDs had not logged onto the system for more than 180 days. Moreover, five of the 45 user-IDs in our sample were invalid. NYPD officials stated that three of these user-IDs were used by the NYPD to test the system, and one user-ID belonged to a retired sergeant. They did not provide an explanation for the remaining invalid user-ID. These invalid user-IDs are still on the NYPD User List. The failure to delete access for these individuals violates Directive 18, which requires "deactivation of inactive user accounts and accounts for employees whose services have terminated."

In addition, our analysis of the Current User Privilege Report revealed that of 669 (31%) out of 2,137 users have the highest levels of access to the system. In addition, 528 of the 669 users had not used the system for more than 180 days. Directive 18 § 8.1.2 states that "access authorization must be carefully designed to insure that employees have access only to files or programs that are necessary for their job function." The presence of such a large number of users with high-level access who do not actually use the system for purposes consistent with that level of access constitutes a security risk that exposes DVTS to misuse of system information.

Disaster Recovery Plan

The NYPD does not have a complete, formally approved, and periodically tested Disaster Recovery Plan for DVTS. Directive 18, § 10.1, states: "A formal plan for the recovery of agency operations and the continuation of business after a disruption due to a major loss of computer processing capability is an important part of the information protection plan." In addition, Directive 18 states: "periodic reviews and updates are necessary to insure that the business recovery plan remains current. A comprehensive test should be conducted annually." Since the system is designed to assist NYPD officers in effectively addressing and responding to domestic violence situations, it is important that the NYPD develop a Disaster Recovery Plan for DVTS.

Recommendations

The NYPD should:

1. Ensure that IBI completes and meets all requirements according to contract terms. The NYPD should also ensure that tasks assigned to its project members are completed.

Agency Response: "The Department agrees that IBI should complete all contract requirements. There are a total of eight Domestic Violence System requirements that

remain to be completed by IBI; seven of these involve the NYC Department of Probation. IBI cannot complete these seven requirements until the Probation Department signs a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Police Department concerning system access issues. The Department expects the MOU to be signed in the near future. Following that, IBI will complete the seven requirements.

“For the remaining requirement concerning an orders of protection database, the Xerox Corporation had to first install the orders of protection system before IBI could begin its work on the link to the Domestic Violence system. Xerox recently provided the necessary hardware and software and IBI is now programming the required link. This work should be completed this Summer.

“As the audit indicated, the Department has paid IBI to complete the above requirements.”

2. Obtain a quality assurance individual to review future system changes and enhancements.

Agency Response: “The NYPD’s Management Information Systems Division will request funding for a quality assurance individual for any enhancements to the Domestic Violence system as well as other future system development projects. This policy was established in June 2002.”

3. Meet with system users to ensure that the problems identified in this report are resolved.

Agency Response: “The Department’s Management Information Systems Division has resolved or is working to resolve all problems with the Domestic Violence system that have been identified by the Domestic Violence Unit—the owner of the system. The Domestic Violence Unit supervisors address valid user concerns. Domestic Violence Unit personnel as well as other users make routine requests for support help by telephone to MISD. Serious issues of a complicated nature are forwarded through the commanding officer to MISD Feedback that has been provided to the Domestic Violence Unit concerning the recent improvements to the system has been positive.

“The Domestic Violence unit will review the Comptroller’s user survey to evaluate and resolve identified problems. We are requesting that the Comptroller’s Office provide copies of the completed surveys (without employee names).”

Auditor Comment: We provided the user survey that was requested by the NYPD at the exit conference that took place on June 18, 2002, and again on July 8, 2002, after we received NYPD's response to this audit.

4. Develop formal security policies and procedures for DVTS that comply with Directive 18.

Agency Response: “We agree with the Comptroller that it is necessary to have a formal security policy and procedure. The Department has a security procedure in place that requires a unit’s commanding officer to submit a written request to the Commanding Officer, MISD, providing a name and tax number for each employee to be granted access to the NYPD mainframe. MISD assigns a temporary password to the employee who then replaces it with his/her own password. Every 90 days the employee must change his/her password or be automatically denied access to the mainframe system. The employee cannot access the Domestic Violence system without having access to the mainframe.

“In addition, access to the Domestic Violence system is controlled at each department unit by an Integrity Control Officer (ICO). This process is described in the attached NYPD Operations Order #19, issued 3/23/01, which introduced the Domestic Violence computer system as a pilot project. A Department Interim Order that will govern the city-wide Domestic Violence computer system, including the ICO’s role in controlling access to the system, is being reviewed prior to promulgation. In each order, the ICO gives an employee access to the system and maintains a list of the command’s authorized users.”

5. Eliminate inactive users, as required by Directive 18.

Agency Response: “The Department agrees that inactive users of the Domestic Violence computer system should be eliminated from the system.

“As we stated in our response to audit recommendation number four, each command’s Integrity Control Officer is responsible for managing the authorization of users of the Domestic Violence system. This includes the deletion of users who should no longer have access to the system.

“While a number of users may access the system intermittently, the Domestic Violence Unit, which is the owner of the system, has decided that these individuals need to retain their access. An employee’s regular job assignment may require only intermittent use of the system, e.g., a precinct Principal Administrative Associate may only use the system to train newly assigned staff. Other employees may need occasional access as a result of temporary assignments, e.g., a patrol officer who must access the system when performing administrative duties on a civilian holiday.

“In addition, the auditors inadvertently overestimated the number of inactive system users. This was the result of interpreting a date on a Domestic Violence system report as the last date the user logged on when it actually represented the last change in the user’s access level, active/inactive status or command.”

Auditor Comment: Our analysis was based on the last dates the users logged on to the system as represented by the NYPD. Notwithstanding management’s comments, we are pleased that the NYPD agreed with our recommendation to eliminate all inactive users from the system.

6. Develop a formal Disaster Recovery Plan for DVTS and ensure that it is tested in accordance with Directive 18.

Agency Response: “The Department agrees that a formal Disaster Recovery Plan is necessary for all essential computer applications.

“Because of this belief, the Department has awarded a contract to IBM that will establish a disaster recovery process for all essential non-SPRINT computer applications, including the Domestic Violence system, and provide a disaster recovery site outside of the City. Should a disaster affect the mainframe data center at Police Headquarters, this recovery process would take place at the new recovery site. The City’s Law Department and IBM are reviewing the proposed contract. Once it is satisfactory to both, it will be sent to the Mayor’s Contract Office and then registered by the NYC Comptroller.”



POLICE DEPARTMENT

Office of Management Analysis and Planning
One Police Plaza, Room 1403

ADDENDUM
Page 1 of 10

July 2, 2002

Mr. Roger Liwer
Assistant Comptroller for Audits
The City of New York
Office of the Comptroller
1 Centre Street, Room 1100
New York, N.Y. 10007

**Re: Domestic Violence
Computer System Draft Audit
Report (Audit # 7A02-061)**

Dear Mr. Liwer:

We wish to thank the Comptroller for the opportunity to review this draft report concerning the Domestic Violence computer system and comment upon the audit's methodology, findings, and recommendations. We have been conscientious in our review and, consequently, trust that our comments will be seriously considered by your office and be reflected in the audit's final report.

We agree with your conclusion that our Domestic Violence computer system allows for future enhancements and further periodic upgrades.

The Domestic Violence computer system, which became effective citywide in August 2001, has significantly improved the Department's timely access to domestic violence information. This has enabled the Department to better combat domestic violence and protect victims and their families.

The Police Department has replaced a limited stand-alone system with a computer network. This provides enforcement commands throughout the city (e.g., precincts, housing police service areas) with access to citywide domestic incident report data. The system also allows access to other department computer systems (e.g., complaints, arrests, warrants, gun licensing) without having to leave one system and enter another or use different computer terminals. Two enhancements currently being developed are linkages to the New York State Police Information Network (NYSPIN) and the Department of Probation. Two of the proposed expansions that require future funding are direct

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access by the various District Attorney Offices and linkage to the New York State Department of Criminal Justice Services database.

The Department agrees with the six recommendations contained in the audit report and will implement recommendations two and three. The subject matters of the four remaining recommendations were already being addressed by the Department prior to the commencement of your audit.

Please refer to the attached Audit Implementation Plan for the Department's response to each of the Comptroller's recommendations.

We appreciate the Comptroller's efforts to conduct the audit and prepare the report. We hope your office found that the Department demonstrated its policy of cooperation with the Comptroller's office during the course of the audit.

If you have any questions concerning this response, please call Deputy Audit Coordinator Michael Manzollilo at 646-610-8365.

Sincerely,


Joanne Jaffe
Assistant Chief
Commanding Officer

Attachment
Copy: M. Manzollilo
Mayor's Office of Operations
2002-06-21

NYPD AUDIT IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

Auditing Agency	New York City Comptroller
Audit Title/Subject	Development and Implementation of the Police Department's Domestic Violence Tracking System
Audit #	7A02-150

AUDIT REPORT STATUS	Draft Report	Report Dated	June 11, 2002
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LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS AND PD EVALUATION OF EACH

#	Recommendation	Category				
		"A" Agree. Will Imple- Ment.	"B" Agree. Can't Imple- Ment.	"C" Disagree. Won't Imple- Ment.	"D" Not Necessary. A Planned or Existing Practice.	"E" Require s Study.
1.	The NYPD should ensure that IBI complete and meet all requirements according to contract terms. The NYPD should also ensure that tasks assigned to its project members are completed.				X	
2.	The NYPD should obtain a quality assurance individual to review future system changes and enhancements.	X				
3.	The NYPD should meet with the system users to ensure that the problems identified in this report are resolved.	X				
4.	The NYPD should develop formal security policies and procedures for the Domestic Violence Tracking System that comply with Directive 18.				X	
5.	The NYPD should eliminate inactive users, as required by Directive 18.				X	
6.	The NYPD should develop a formal Disaster Recovery Plan for the Domestic Violence Tracking System and ensure that it is tested in accordance with Directive 18.				X	

Category "A"	We agree with the recommendation and have implemented or will attempt to implement.
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Recommendation # 2	Report Page # 8
Recommendation	

The NYPD should obtain a quality assurance individual to review future system changes and enhancements.

Implementation Methods/Procedures and Projected/Actual Implementation Date

The NYPD's Management Information Systems Division will request funding for a quality assurance individual for any enhancements to the Domestic Violence system as well as other future system development projects. This policy was established in June 2002.

Recommendation # 3	Report Page # 8
Recommendation	

The NYPD should meet with system users to ensure that the problems identified in this report are resolved.

Implementation Methods/Procedures and Projected/Actual Implementation Date

The Department's Management Information Systems Division has resolved or is working to resolve all problems with the Domestic Violence system that have been identified by the Domestic Violence Unit – the owner of the system. The Domestic Violence Unit supervisors address valid user concerns. Domestic Violence Unit personnel as well as other users make routine requests for support help by telephone to MISD. Serious issues of a complicated nature are forwarded through the commanding officer to MISD. Feedback that has been provided to the Domestic Violence Unit concerning the recent improvements to the system has been positive.

The Domestic Violence Unit will review the Comptroller's user survey to evaluate and resolve identified problems. We are requesting that the Comptroller's Office provide copies of the completed surveys (without employees' names).

Category "D"	The recommendation is not necessary because it calls for an action, policy or practice that was planned or existed independent of the audit.
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Recommendation #	1	Report Page #	8
Recommendation			
<p><i>The NYPD should ensure that IBI complete and meet all requirements according to contract terms. The NYPD should also ensure that tasks assigned to its project members are completed.</i></p>			
Explanation			
<p>The Department agrees that IBI should complete all contract requirements. There are a total of eight Domestic Violence System requirements that remain to be completed by IBI; seven of these involve the NYC Department of Probation. IBI cannot complete these seven requirements until the Probation Department signs a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Police Department concerning system access issues. The Department expects the MOU to be signed in the near future. Following that, IBI will complete the seven requirements.</p> <p>For the remaining requirement concerning an orders of protection database, the Xerox Corporation had to first install the orders of protection system before IBI could begin its work on the link to the Domestic Violence system. Xerox recently provided the necessary hardware and software and IBI is now programming the required link. This work should be completed this Summer.</p> <p>As the audit indicated, the Department has paid IBI to complete the above requirements.</p>			

Recommendation #	4	Report Page #	8
Recommendation			
<p><i>The NYPD should develop formal security policies and procedures for the Domestic Violence system that comply with Directive 18.</i></p>			
Explanation			
<p>We agree with the Comptroller that it is necessary to have a formal security policy and procedure. The Department has a security procedure in place that requires a unit's commanding officer to submit a written request to the Commanding Officer, MISD providing a name and tax number for each employee to be granted access to the NYPD mainframe. MISD assigns a temporary password to the employee who then replaces it with his/her own password. Every 90 days the employee must change his/her password or be automatically denied access to the mainframe system. The employee cannot access the Domestic Violence system without having access to the mainframe.</p>			

In addition, access to the Domestic Violence system is controlled at each department unit by an Integrity Control Officer (ICO). This process is described in the attached NYPD Operations Order #19, issued 3/23/01, which introduced the Domestic Violence computer system as a pilot project. A Department Interim Order that will govern the city-wide Domestic Violence computer system, including the ICO's role in controlling access to the system, is being reviewed prior to promulgation. In each order, the ICO gives an employee access to the system and maintains a list of the command's authorized users.

Recommendation #	5	Report Page #	8
Recommendation			
<i>The NYPD should eliminate inactive users, as required by directive 18.</i>			
Explanation			
<p>The Department agrees that inactive users of the Domestic Violence computer system should be eliminated from the system.</p> <p>As we stated in our response to audit recommendation number four, each command's Integrity Control Officer is responsible for managing the authorization of users of the Domestic Violence system. This includes the deletion of users who should no longer have access to the system.</p> <p>While a number of users may access the system intermittently, the Domestic Violence Unit, which is the owner of the system, has decided that these individuals need to retain their access. An employee's regular job assignment may require only intermittent use of the system, e.g., a precinct Principal Administrative Associate may only use the system to train newly assigned staff. Other employees may need occasional access as a result of temporary assignments, e.g., a patrol officer who must access the system when performing administrative duties on a civilian holiday.</p> <p>In addition, the auditors inadvertently overestimated the number of inactive system users. This was the result of interpreting a date on a Domestic Violence system report as the last date the user logged on when it actually represented the last change in the user's access level, active/inactive status or command.</p>			

Recommendation #	6	Report Page #	8
Recommendation			
<i>The NYPD should develop a formal Disaster Recovery Plan for the Domestic Violence Tracking System and ensure that it is tested in accordance with Directive 18.</i>			
Explanation			
<p>The Department agrees that a formal Disaster Recovery Plan is necessary for all essential computer applications.</p> <p>Because of this belief, the Department has awarded a contract to IBM that will establish a disaster recovery process for all essential non-SPRINT computer applications, including the Domestic Violence system, and provide a disaster recovery site outside of the City. Should a disaster affect the mainframe data center at Police Headquarters, this recovery process would take place at the new recovery site. The City's Law Department and IBM are reviewing the proposed contract. Once it is satisfactory to both, it will be sent to the Mayor's Contract Office and then registered by the NYC Comptroller.</p>			



OPERATIONS ORDER

ADDENDUM
Page 8 of 10

SUBJECT: PILOT PROJECT-PATROL BOROUGH STATEN ISLAND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE DATABASE SYSTEM	
DATE ISSUED:	NUMBER:
03-23-01	19

1. In order to improve response to domestic violence cases, the Department has initiated a pilot project enabling different commands to access domestic violence information from one (1) central database. Presently each command maintains its own separate domestic violence database created from the information contained in the New York State Domestic Incident Report (DCJS-3221). Consequently, the domestic violence history of a particular offender or victim may not be known to personnel in an adjoining command.

2. Patrol Borough Staten Island (120, 122, and 123 Precincts and the Staten Island Housing Unit) have been designated to participate in this pilot project. These commands will enter the information from Domestic Incident Reports directly into a new central repository, the Domestic Violence Database System. With this Database each participating command will now be able to access accurate and timely domestic violence information regardless of the location of occurrence. The Domestic Violence Database System will eventually incorporate all Domestic Incident Reports, past and present, and be expanded on a citywide basis, permitting comprehensive tracking and analysis of domestic violence incidents.

3. Accordingly, members of the service will comply with the following procedure whenever entering the information from Domestic Incident Reports into the new Domestic Violence Database System:

- PURPOSE** To improve the tracking, monitoring, and analysis of domestic violence cases.
- PROCEDURE** Whenever entering information from a command's past/current Domestic Incident Report into the new Domestic Violence Database System:
- UNIFORMED MEMBER OF THE SERVICE** 1. Submit hard copy of Domestic Incident Report to desk officer.
- DESK OFFICER** 2. Review hard copy of Domestic Incident Report for accuracy and completeness and sign.
3. Direct command clerk to enter information from the Domestic Incident Report into the Domestic Violence Database System.
- COMMAND CLERK** 4. Enter information from the Domestic Incident Report into the Domestic Violence Database System and print out computer copy.
5. Attach hard copy and computer copy and present them to the desk officer for review.
- NOTE** *The command clerk will prepare a Domestic Incident Report for walk-in complainants reporting domestic incidents whenever the command's domestic violence officer is not available to do so.*

- DESK OFFICER** 6. Review computer copy for accuracy and completeness.
7. Forward both copies to the command's domestic violence officer/designated reviewer.
- DOMESTIC VIOLENCE OFFICER/DESIGNATED REVIEWER** 8. Obtain victim and/or offender number from database.
9. Query the Domestic Violence Database System for the following offender information:
a. Warrant history
b. Investigation card status
c. Gun license/permit status
d. Criminal recidivist history
e. Targeted narcotics violator status
f. Domestic violence history

NOTE

Results of the New York State Police Information Network (NYSPIN) inquiries concerning orders of protection, probation status and arrest history (Booking Arraignment Disposition System [BADS]), and complaint history (On Line Complaint System [OLCS]), will be entered onto the appropriate captions of the Domestic Incident Report review screen.

10. Ensure that all computer inquiries regarding the offender are completed during the tour in which they are commenced.
a. Attach printouts of all inquiries listed in step 9 to the Domestic Incident Report.
11. Forward both copies of the Domestic Incident Report back to the desk officer or domestic violence supervisor for endorsement.
- DESK OFFICER/ DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SUPERVISOR** 12. Review the Domestic Incident Report computer summary screen.
a. Ensure that all Domestic Incident Reports and the necessary offender queries are completed.
13. Utilize the supervisory sign off function to finalize each Domestic Incident Report thereby entering it into the Domestic Violence Database System.
a. Print finalized copy of Domestic Incident Report.
14. Void any duplicate Domestic Incident Reports and those entered in error.
- DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PREVENTION OFFICER** 15. Utilize the computer's add/view "follow-up comments function" to enter new information (e.g. results of home visits) onto the Domestic Incident Report.
- PRECINCT DETECTIVE SQUAD MEMBER** 16. Enter case closing status of any resolved domestic violence case into the Domestic Violence Database System.

**ADDITIONAL
DATA**

Due to the sensitive nature of the Database information, access will be controlled through passwords and is limited to authorized users. Command integrity control officers will maintain a list of authorized password users and set each user's access as appropriate.

Initially, only the following selected NYPD personnel will have access to view information within the Domestic Violence Database System during the pilot project:

From the 120, 122, 123 precincts
and S.I. Housing Unit

Commanding officer
Domestic violence supervisor
Domestic violence prevention officer
Detective squad members
Command clerical staff

From outside commands

Patrol borough domestic violence coordinator
Police service area commanding officer
Detective borough
Chief of Department Domestic Violence Unit
License Division

Commands will access the Domestic Violence Database System from local area network (LAN) workstations that have Internet Explorer Browser installed. Once the system issues a sequential number and the Domestic Incident Report is reviewed by the domestic violence officer, only a supervisor from the precinct of occurrence is permitted to make modifications. Additionally, once a desk officer/domestic violence supervisor has finalized a Domestic Incident Report for entry into the Domestic Violence Database System, no modifications will be allowed. (This does not include domestic violence officer notes or detective case closing).

4. Commanding officers will ensure that the contents of this order are brought to the attention of members of their commands.

BY DIRECTION OF THE POLICE COMMISSIONER

DISTRIBUTION
All Commands

OPERATIONS ORDER NO. 19

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