



**MARK LEVINE**  
NEW YORK CITY COMPTROLLER

# The Monty Hall Contracts

Unchecked Spending Across the City's  
Master Agreements

BUREAU OF CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION

May 05, 2026

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# Letter from Comptroller Levine

Dear New Yorkers,

Every year the City enters into billions of dollars worth of contracts for critical goods and services on behalf of New Yorkers. These purchases often come under justified scrutiny because New Yorkers deserve to know that their tax dollars are being spent fairly, strategically, and judiciously. Now, as our city faces one of the most challenging budgetary landscapes in years, it has never been more important that we have a clear and complete accounting of what our government is buying.



Master Agreements are a special type of contract that help agencies quickly acquire supplies, technologies, and services that may be necessary for them to carry out their missions. They are also very popular, accounting for nearly \$9 billion across tens of thousands of transactions during the Adams administration alone. Unfortunately, the City’s systems that manage these purchases are decades behind the curve, creating situations where the public and oversight agencies can’t see the true nature of these transactions.

When we don’t have clear records of what the City is buying waste flourishes. New Yorkers cannot afford to treat our procurement process like a black box. This report on Master Agreements, the first of its kind released by our office, explores the positives and negatives of these contracts. It also details exactly how we can ensure that city spending is well managed.

We need to move aggressively to modernize our systems and be more strategic about managing City purchases. By bringing our technology and processes into the 21st century and demanding total transparency, we can ensure that every dollar we spend is an investment in our future, rather than a lost entry in a hidden ledger. Together, we can build a city government that is as efficient, honest, and dynamic as the people it serves.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Mark D. Levine". The signature is fluid and cursive, written in a professional style.

Mark D. Levine  
New York City Comptroller

# Executive Summary

Contracts enable the City and its agencies to provide critical services for the public. An agency may determine that a new contract is needed to procure goods and services that are essential to its operations (e.g., securing office supplies or IT services for its staff). In other cases, an agency may need to use contracts as a mechanism to fulfill certain policy initiatives like expanding childcare access.

How the City determines that a good, service, or construction is needed, and where and how they are delivered, varies. It can be easier to budget and plan for purchases when agencies know how much of a good or service it will need, and when it will need it. However, in some cases the City can only estimate what its needs will be.

Master Agreements (MA1s) are used by the City in situations where there is a projected future need, but agencies don't know how exactly how much or how often they'll need to buy it. These agreements establish an "on-call" relationship with vendors under pre-arranged contractual terms. This arrangement allows City agencies to buy commonly needed goods or services more quickly than if they had to go through a whole procurement cycle for each such purchase.

Unlike other types of contracts managed by the City, the MA1 contract values that appear on Checkbook NYC only reflect an estimate of how much they will be used. Once the MA1 is established, City agencies can make purchases that cumulatively exceed the contract's listed value. These purchases are made via Delivery Orders (DO1s), which are not subject to Comptroller review.<sup>1</sup>

## Opaque Records Risk Wasteful and Bloated Spending

Mayoral agencies placed orders worth over \$8.8 billion under MA1s between FY22 and FY25, but the public, and even oversight agencies, have far less transparency into these transactions relative to other kinds of procurements. This is because DO1s often don't contain information about what the City bought, such as: transaction descriptions, quantity of units purchased, actual per-unit price, or manufacturer information. This can

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<sup>1</sup> Per PPB 2-12(b)(1)

make it impossible for stakeholders inside and outside of government to understand why some MA1 contracts are significantly overspent relative to their estimated values.

There are several ways that the City and taxpayers could benefit from more transparency into MA1 purchases. At a time when the City is facing financial headwinds, better data could improve the quality of needs-estimates, resulting in cheaper prices for goods and services covered by MA1s. A clearer accounting of the goods and services purchased under MA1s would be a further safeguard against the misuse of taxpayer dollars. Finally, we should have a clearer understanding of what public dollars are purchasing, especially given the high-value purchases that are common among DO1 transactions.

## Findings

- 1. Major Business: The City processes billions of dollars under MA1 contracts, across tens of thousands of DO1s, each year.** Between FY22 and FY25, Mayoral agencies processed an average of 28,057 DO1s per year. For context, this average is more than double the number of new contracts the City registered in FY25 (12,900). The total value of DO1s registered between FY22-FY25 exceeds \$8.8 billion.
- 2. Bad Guesswork: MA1 values are often based on inaccurate needs estimates.** Mayoral agencies significantly underspent against the estimated contract value (less than 50%) on one out of every three MA1s registered since 2015.<sup>2</sup> They also overspent on one out of every three of these contracts, running up an excess of over \$3.1 billion. Despite the similar share of contracts in these two buckets, agencies ultimately overspent the cumulative value of all MA1s by more than \$1.6 billion.
- 3. Poor Visibility: Publicly available information about DO1 purchases is extremely limited.** Checkbook NYC users can look up DO1s associated with a MA1 contract and see how much the City has spent against these records. However, DO1s lack important details such as what specific products the City is purchasing, at what quantities, and from whom. This is especially a challenge for complex MA1s that cover multiple products and manufacturers.
- 4. Less Oversight: Accelerated Procurements are subject to less oversight prior to registration than other MA1 contracts.** Accelerated Procurement contracts are used by The Department of Citywide Administrative Services (DCAS) to fast-track the bidding

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<sup>2</sup> For the purposes of this analysis, this report examined expired contracts against which there can be no further spending.

process for commodities. Even though they can be quite lucrative, these contracts are exempt from public hearing requirements and registration by the Comptroller's office. The City spent more than \$625 million against 346 Accelerated Procurement contracts since FY22, none of which were subject to review by the Comptroller.

5. **Outdated Systems: The City is not making full use of its tools to streamline MA1 purchases and consolidate related data.** Mayoral agencies can currently requisition some MA1-supplied goods via tools like PunchOut and the Procurement and Sourcing Solutions Portal (PASSPort) Catalogue. These tools function like an online shopping portal where desired items and quantities can be ordered by permissioned agency users. Upon "checkout" the system records key details and creates a DO1 record in FMS on the agency user's behalf. Unfortunately, only a handful of MA1 contracts are hosted in PunchOut or the PASSPort Catalogue.

## Recommendations

1. **Expand centralized tools to cover all MA1 purchases by Mayoral agencies.** A centralized system for managing orders under all Mayoral MA1s, including service and Citywide IT contracts, would eliminate substantial staff burdens associated with the manual creation of individual DO1 records. Such tools would also allow the City to more easily capture detailed purchase information under these orders. Finally, comprehensive data collected under the tool would be easier to assemble and share with key stakeholders, including the public.
2. **The Mayor and Comptroller should collaborate to make more DO1 transaction data available to the Public.** Information flows between PASSPort and FMS should be enhanced to capture additional DO1 transaction data such as ordered quantity, type of unit, unit price, commodity line and/or transaction description, and vendor. Such data would then be made available to the public via Checkbook NYC. Similarly, the Mayor's office should make DO1 transaction data available to the public via platforms like NYC Open Data.
3. **The City should improve its methodologies for estimating costs associated with MA1 purchases.** Agencies like DCAS currently rely on inexact inputs, like optional agency surveys, to assess demand for goods and services that it will procure via MA1 contracts. The City's struggles to accurately estimate demand can make it harder for agencies to negotiate the best price on behalf of taxpayers. Having access to complete and centralized MA1 purchasing data could benefit agencies like DCAS and OTI in developing more accurate cost estimates.

#### 4. The City should draw on more robust MA1 purchase data to identify cost savings.

As part of their efforts to drive down the budget gap inherited from the prior administration, the Mayor’s office should take a close look at the high share of MA1 contracts that have been overspent relative to their estimated value. Some cost drivers could be curtailed with more oversight and planning. The City should renegotiate better rates in other areas where we’ve previously underestimated our collective buying power.

## Master Agreements (MA1s): A Primer

MA1s enable City Agencies to streamline the typically lengthy process for making purchases by establishing an “on-call” relationship with vendors under pre-arranged contractual terms. These contracts are typically used by the City in situations where there is a projected future need, but agencies don’t know exactly how much or how often they’ll need to buy it. Master Agreements benefit vendors, since they have the potential to sell a higher volume of goods or services than they could under a typical contract. They also help City agencies procure commonly needed goods or services more quickly than if they had to go through a whole procurement cycle for each such purchase.

MA1s also seek to achieve economies of scale by leveraging the City’s greater buying power to get the best possible price for a good or service. Although just a few City agencies can establish MA1 contracts, many of them can be used by other agencies to make purchases.<sup>3</sup> Actual purchases under these contracts are made via Delivery Orders (DO1s), which are not subject to Comptroller review.<sup>4</sup>

Besides making goods and services available for purchase on an as-needed basis, MA1s stand apart from other contracts in several ways. Some MA1s must be used by Mayoral agencies whenever they want to purchase a particular good or service. Other MA1s cover a clearing house of goods and services provided by numerous vendors. Finally, MA1 values are approximated based on the City’s expected use of a given contract. The City may never end up purchasing anything under a registered MA1, or it could spend many times on the listed value of the contract.

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
<sup>3</sup> Only Department of Citywide Administrative Services (DCAS), the Office of Technology and Innovation (OTI), and New York City Public Schools (NYCPS) are authorized to register MA1 contracts. Since the focus of this report is on the use of MA1s by Mayoral agencies, NYCPS MA1 records are excluded from the following analyses.

<sup>4</sup> Per PPB 2-12(b)(1)

# Recent Trends in MA1 Use: FY22-FY25


This section provides data on the volume and value of MA1s, and related purchase, during the Mayor Eric Adams (MEA) Administration. Chart 1 illustrates how mayoral agencies have registered hundreds of MA1s, valued at nearly \$6 billion, over the prior four fiscal years.

**Chart 1: Volume, Value and Spend of Mayoral MA1s Registered By FY**



However, registered MA1 values only reflect an estimate of how many goods or services will be purchased under the contract. Actual purchases are reflected via individual DO1 records. Per Chart 2, tens of thousands of DO1s are recorded each year accounting for nearly \$9 billion since FY22.

**Chart 2: Volume, Value and Spend of Mayoral DO1s Registered By FY**



Although just a few City agencies can establish MA1 contracts, many of them can be used by other agencies to make purchases.<sup>5</sup> Table 1 lists the five agencies that have made the most purchases under MA1 contracts since FY22. Together, these agencies account for more than 60% of the total value of orders placed by Mayoral agencies.

**Table 1: Share of Mayoral DO1 Value by Funding Agency, FY22-FY25**

Funding Agencies	Total DO1 Value	Share of Total DO1 Value
<b>OTI</b>	\$1,425,155,163	16.69%
<b>DSNY</b>	\$1,256,033,596	14.71%
<b>NYPD</b>	\$991,767,091	11.61%
<b>DCAS</b>	\$818,758,294	9.59%
<b>FDNY</b>	\$778,172,177	9.11%
<b>All Other Mayoral Agencies</b>	<b>\$3,269,193,569</b>	<b>38.28%</b>

<sup>5</sup> Only Department of Citywide Administrative Services (DCAS), the Office of Technology and Innovation (OTI), and New York City Public Schools (NYCPS) are authorized to register MA1 contracts. Since the focus of this report is on the use of MA1s by Mayoral agencies, NYCPS MA1 records are excluded from the following analyses.

# Bad Guesswork: MA1 Value Estimates from January 2015- June 2025

Registered contract values are a key indicator for stakeholders, including the public, to understand the size and scope of City purchases. However, unlike most general contracts that the City uses to purchase known quantities of goods and services, MA1s are typically used to facilitate purchases on an as-needed basis. Since the total value of future orders isn't yet known, agencies list an estimated contract value instead. In fact, the City may never end up purchasing anything under a registered MA1, or it could spend many times the listed value of the contract.


How well agencies estimate the need for goods or services procured via MA1s also has implications for cost negotiations. In situations where the City can use its size to secure better prices, underestimating need can result in unrealized savings. Table 2 illustrates how mayoral agencies significantly underspent against the estimated contract value (less than 50%) on one out of every three MA1s registered since 2015. They also overspent on one out of every three of these contracts to the tune of over \$3.1 billion. Despite the similar share of underspent and overspent contracts, agencies overspent the net value of all MA1 contracts by more than \$1.6 billion.

**Table 2: Registered MA1s (Completed Terms): 2015-2025**

Spending Category	# of Contracts	% Share of Contracts	Total Contract Value	Total Spent
<b>No Spend</b>	156	7.77%	\$417,743,543	\$1,523,191
<b>&lt;1%-25%</b>	277	13.79%	\$1,225,326,032	\$129,878,687
<b>25%-50%</b>	245	12.20%	\$721,634,116	\$264,522,221
<b>50%-75%</b>	273	13.60%	\$724,831,299	\$453,863,707
<b>75%-100%</b>	316	15.74%	\$902,242,692	\$801,180,068
<b>100%-200%</b>	423	21.07%	\$2,014,055,712	\$2,822,803,947
<b>&gt;200%</b>	318	15.84%	\$699,730,458	\$3,847,674,292
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>2,008</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>\$6,705,563,853</b>	<b>\$8,321,446,112</b>

Chart 3 breaks down the share of completed MA1s by their spending category. Mayoral agencies spent less than 50% of the estimated contract value for a third of MA1s. Another third of the MA1s were overspent.

**Chart 3: Registered MA1s (Completed Terms), Breakdown by Spending Category: 2015-2025**



These high underutilization rates, which are also present for Multiple Master Agreements (MMA1s) were analyzed in more detail in the FY24 Annual M/WBE Procurement report’s “Master Contracts of Disguise” section.<sup>6</sup> This report found that many high-value Master Agreements that the City awarded to M/WBEs had paid out very little to these vendors, if anything at all. Because prior administrations have used registered contract values to track the success of the M/WBE performance goal program, Master Agreements have erroneously skewed totals for both M/WBE and non-certified vendors.

For either type of Master Agreement, underutilization not only misrepresents the actual contract value going to vendors, it also creates unnecessary strains on agency and vendor staff. The process to bid, and evaluate bids, for Master Agreements can be time consuming and onerous. Such burdens are hard to justify when the City’s procurement system is already plagued by registration delays, especially when many Master Agreements are hardly used or not used at all.

<sup>6</sup> For more information, see: <https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/annual-report-on-fy-24-mwbe-procurement/#master-contracts-of-disguise>

# Agency Case Study – Billions in Overspending at the Office of Technology Innovation

The Office of Technology Innovation (OTI) delivers critical technology solutions to over 100 offices and agencies throughout the City. OTI's MA1 contracts play an essential role in this work by making it easier for City agencies to acquire IT goods and services. Rather than going through a lengthy procurement process for every technology purchase, agencies can simply place delivery orders for the needed good or service under one of OTI's existing Citywide IT contracts.


OTI's Citywide IT contracts function a little differently than other MA1s. Instead of establishing terms with a single technology manufacturer or service purveyor, the City contracts with clearing houses, which in turn hold relationships with many such vendors. The City benefits from the expanded reach that these clearing houses provide, as well as from discounts that clearing houses negotiate with the technology manufacturers. While City agencies have come to rely on the reach and expediency of these contracts, they have also confounded financial oversights and transparency advocates who cannot determine exactly what was purchased or from whom.

As reflected in Chart 4 below, the City overspent against OTI's MA1 contracts by nearly \$4 billion over their cumulative estimated value. While other MA1-issuing agencies saw similar levels of overspend, OTI manages less MA1 contracts by multiple orders of magnitude. Most of this overspending is attributable to the Citywide IT contracts, two of which account for over \$1 billion each (and approximately \$3 billion together) in overspending by the City.<sup>7</sup> No other MA1s have been overspent by \$1 billion or more in the last decade.

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<sup>7</sup>MA1-858- 20191200196 (CDW GOVERNMENT LLC) was overspent by \$1.93 billion when the data for this report was pulled. MA1-959- 20191200181 (SHI INTERNATIONAL CORP) was overspent by \$1.09 billion).

### Chart 4: Net Total Overspending for OTI Master Agreements



Critical information about what technology products and services are driving overspend on OTI’s MA1s contracts isn’t visible to oversight agencies or the public. For instance, OTI’s Citywide IT contract with CDW Government LLC (CDW), which the City overspent by \$2 billion, covers over 740 unique manufacturers and service providers. However, the DO1 records issued under this MA1 contract don’t contain any information about what specific products and services were purchased, or which vendors provided them. In some cases, OTI has even failed to provide documentation to the Comptroller’s Office indicating which manufacturers and service providers are covered under these agreements.<sup>8</sup>

Without such information, key stakeholders are at a significant disadvantage when looking for ways to control costs and reduce unnecessary spending. Additionally, OTI could be forgoing significant savings when these agreements fail to capture the full breadth of the City’s collective buying power. The Mayor’s office recently announced that OTI would renegotiate its technology contacts to find savings, but it must move quickly.<sup>9</sup> At the time this report is being written, new Citywide IT contracts for CDW and SHI International Corp are in the procurement pipeline with a combined estimated value of \$2 billion.

<sup>8</sup> See MA1-858-20238806967 - WORLD WIDE TECHNOLOGY LLC in the MA1 Contract Case Study section for more information.

<sup>9</sup> Office of the Mayor. “Mayor Mamdani Releases Update on Savings Plan”.3/25/26. Press Release. <https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2026/03/mayor-mamdani-releases-update-on-savings-plan>

# Accelerated Procurement Master Agreements

The Comptroller’s Bureau of Contracts Administration (BCA) is responsible for the review and registration of all City procurement and revenue contracts, real property transactions, contract modifications, and task orders pursuant to the Charter, unless registration authority has been otherwise delegated.<sup>10</sup> These reviews ensure that public dollars are being used in accordance with applicable law. BCA specifically checks that the procedural requisites and required certifications discussed above have been followed, that there was no corruption in the letting of the contract, and that the awarded vendor has not been debarred and appears capable of meeting the contract requirements.

However, Accelerated Procurement contracts represent a notable exception to the usual practice of agencies self-registering only low-dollar contracts. Used by the Department of Citywide Administrative Services (DCAS) to fast-track the bidding process for commodities, these purchases are executed using Master Agreement contracts that can be quite lucrative. Since FY22, Accelerated Procurement contracts have averaged nearly \$2 million per contract, with some exceeding \$50 million. The City spent more than \$625 million against 346 unique contacts during this period, none of which were subject to review by the Comptroller’s Office.

While it’s important that the City can secure the best prices for vital commodities, insufficient oversight of Accelerated Procurements can increase opportunities for the misuse of public dollars.

## What are Accelerated Procurements?

Accelerated Procurements enable agencies to fast track the bidding process for commodity purchases such as fuel that must be obtained quickly due to shortages or rapid price fluctuations. In addition to Comptroller registration reviews, Accelerated Procurements are also exempt from public hearing requirements. Agencies may only use this method for commodities that have been determined eligible for Accelerated Procurement by the City Chief Procurement Officer (CCPO) and they can only make contract award decisions based solely on which responsive and responsible vendor offers

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<sup>10</sup> NYC Charter §328(d)


the best price.<sup>11</sup> Eligible commodities are typically those at risk of falling into short supply or those that are subject to short-term price fluctuations.

The Department of Citywide Administrative Services (DCAS) is the only agency that uses the Accelerated Procurement method. Absent directives to delegate this authority, DCAS is mandated under the Charter to purchase, inspect, store and distribute all goods, supplies, materials, equipment and other personal property required by any City agency.

## Accelerated Procurements Account for a Significant Share of Mayoral Agency Master Agreements<sup>12</sup>

Mayoral agencies registered 876 MA1s since FY22 with a cumulative contract value of \$5.87 billion. Nearly four-in-ten of these MA1 contracts were purchased via the Accelerated Procurement method. Per Chart 5, Accelerated Procurements are a close second to Competitive Sealed Bids for the most common type of MA1 contact.

**Chart 5: Share of Mayoral MA1 Volume by Procurement Method, FY22-25**



<sup>11</sup> NYC Charter §326(a)

<sup>12</sup> Only Department of Citywide Administrative Services (DCAS), the Office of Technology and Innovation (OTI), and New York City Public Schools (NYCPS) are authorized to register MA1 contracts. Since the focus of this report is on the use of MA1s by Mayoral agencies, NYCPS MA1 records are excluded from the following analyses.

While MA1s procured via Competitive Sealed Bid or Intergovernmental Procurement tend to be more lucrative, the 346 Accelerated Procurements registered since FY22 account for over \$688 million in registered contract value. See Chart 6 for a breakdown of cumulative MA1 values by award method.

**Chart 6: Share of Mayoral MA1 Values by Award Method, FY22-FY25**




Table 3 displays the number, value, and amount of City spending against Accelerated Procurement contracts registered since FY22. While contracts registered in FY24 are still relatively new, total spending has already exceeded the total estimated value of MA1s registered that year. This is because all MA1 contract values, including Accelerated Procurements in this table, are approximated by the City based on expected need. While the City may never end up purchasing anything under one particular Accelerated Procurement contract, it could end up spending many times the estimated value of another.


**Table 3: Accelerated Procurements Year over Year, Mayoral Agencies Only**

Registration FY	Number of Contracts	Total Value	Total Spending
2022	106	\$206,175,233	\$217,345,491
2023	64	\$166,528,476	\$165,770,955
2024	118	\$183,687,404	\$214,465,007
2025	58	\$132,213,046	\$28,059,894
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>346</b>	<b>\$688,604,160</b>	<b>\$625,641,346</b>


## Accelerated Procurement DO1s

While DCAS oversees all Accelerated Procurements, other agencies account for the vast majority of orders placed under these contracts. ACS, DOC, and NYPD account for 92.50% of all DO1s under Accelerated Procurements registered since FY22. Meanwhile DEP, DSNY, and DOT account for 61.43% of all ordered value.

**Chart 7: Share of Accelerated Procurement DO1s by Agency: FY22-25**



**Chart 8: Share of Accelerated Procurement DO1 Value by Agency: FY22-25**



## MA1 Contract Case Studies

### MA1-857-20238804225: GARNER ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES, INC.

This Master Agreement is a limited use intergovernmental procurement contract that the City entered via the United States General Services Administration. Its purpose is to help the City quickly purchase goods and services needed for emergency disaster preparedness, response, recovery, logistics and planning. The scope of this MA1 is justifiably expansive given the broad range of emergency situations for which the City must be prepared. Under the Garner contract, the City can purchase goods and services related to power installation, operation and maintenance; sheltering (evacuation, recovery, animal, etc.); catering; laundry, shower, and bathroom facilities and ablution; pumps and pump mission support; base camps, mobile field hospitals and medical clinics (with personnel); transportation and heavy lift; project personnel including managers, supervisors, field logisticians, IT specialists, and equipment operators.

The City registered the Garner contract in FY23 at an estimated value of \$30 million. Since then, City agencies have issued 103 DO1s worth over \$675 million, representing a 2,223%

overspend. Much of this activity appears to be associated with the City’s activities to support the influx of Asylum seekers, however there is no public data breaking down what goods and services were purchased from the contract’s extensive offerings. Were this information to be made available, the public and oversight agencies would be better able to better prepare for future emergencies.

## **MA1-858-20238806967 - WORLD WIDE TECHNOLOGY LLC**

OTI manages several Citywide IT contracts that agencies use to purchase hardware, software, and related services. These MA1s establish purchasing agreements between the City and various IT clearinghouses, who in turn negotiate with multiple manufacturers to secure the lowest prices for their products. While agencies must meet certain purchasing thresholds to use these contracts, they are favored because they allow the City to quickly and easily procure IT goods and services on an as needed basis.

With an estimated value exceeding \$347 million, this Citywide IT MA1 was the most lucrative M/WBE contract that the City registered under the prior administration. Since it became active in May 2022, more than forty City agencies have issued more than 520 DO1s worth over \$276 million (this contract is three years into a five-year term). The contract covers over 70 manufacturers including subdivisions of the same parent companies, however only ten of these manufacturing entities, all under Cisco Systems, were included in documents that OTI filed with the Comptroller’s office.

Despite the high volume of business done under this and other Citywide IT contracts, associated DO1 records reveal almost nothing about which products were purchased from which companies. This lack of transparency is compounded for the World Wide Technology agreement because OTI has thus far failed to provide details and product costs for the vast majority of manufactures covered by the contract.

## **MA1-857-20248800039 – DAMONE BOYD**

DCAS procured this \$840 thousand contract for boxed water via the Accelerated Procurement method, which is exempted from Comptroller reviews and public comment. Nine months after the contract was registered, DCAS found this vendor in default for failing to deliver an order placed by the New York City Emergency Management Office and not responding to repeated communication attempts by the agency regarding said delivery. Further investigation by our Office revealed that this company had previously disclosed to

the City that its annual gross revenue fell between \$0-\$99 thousand calling into question how DCAS determined that the vendor could carry out the contract requirements. DCAS was ultimately forced to expend additional time and resources to secure a replacement contract for the needed commodity, utilizing a different vendor.

## Methodology

The data for this analysis was extracted from the City's Financial Management System (FMS) in the Fall of 2025. Unless otherwise noted, the analysis in this report was derived from an examination of expired MA1s registered by DCAS and OTI between January 1, 2015 to June 30, 2025.

## Acknowledgements

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