A New Charter to Confront New Challenges

Building a 21st Century Government

Reflecting the Importance of Cybersecurity in the City Charter

 Thirty years ago, during the last major Charter Commission review, it was inconceivable that computer hackers could bring local government to its knees by striking at the City government’s information technology system. But, today, that is very much a reality, and the dangers are very real.

In fact, we have already seen this firsthand in New York City, when in 2014, Russian hackers breached the systems of the Administration for Children Services.[1] While that breach was ultimately contained, the risks have only escalated since that time. For instance, in March 2018, Atlanta, Georgia had its city operations ground to a halt after being held hostage by a cybersecurity breach in which hackers effectively shut down government operations and demanded $50,000 to restore services.[2] Meanwhile, data security breaches at companies across the country have resulted in the theft of personal information of millions of Americans and cost the economy billions.[3]

Governments and businesses across the country have responded to these threats by bolstering cybersecurity systems. To this end, in 2017, Mayor de Blasio issued Executive Order No. 28, establishing the New York City Cyber Command. Under this executive order, the Cyber Command is headed by a Chief Information Security Officer who reports directly to the First Deputy Mayor. Among other duties, the executive order empowers the Cyber Command to establish information security policies and standards, direct the response to any cybersecurity incidents that may occur, and ensure that City agencies comply with the appropriate security policies.[4]

It is important that the Charter be responsive to the most pressing issues impacting City government, but given its age, our current City Charter is virtually silent on the subject of cybersecurity. To remedy this shortcoming, the City Charter should be reformed by enshrining the key pillars of Executive Order No. 28 in the Charter. Specifically, the Charter should require the Mayor appoint a Chief Information Security Officer responsible for developing and ensuring compliance with the City’s information security standards and policies.

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The City Charter should be amended to require that the Mayor designate a Chief Information Security Officer responsible for overseeing the City’s cybersecurity operations, including developing the City’s cybersecurity program, maintaining and testing that program, leading incident response, and training relevant City employees on ways to mitigate cybersecurity risks, among other duties.

Protecting Tenants and Preventing Evictions through an Office of Inspection

Despite the existence of a comprehensive building code and housing regulations designed to protect the health, safety, and welfare of New York City residents, too many New Yorkers are forced to live in buildings that are dilapidated, unsanitary, or unsafe. One reason is that the City agencies responsible for overseeing the safety of our buildings have multiple, competing responsibilities. Specifically, the Department of Buildings (DOB), has the responsibility of examining and approving building plans, issuing construction permits, and inspecting properties, while the Department of Housing Preservation and Development (HPD) both inspects buildings and helps finance affordable housing projects.

The resulting lack of sustained focus on inspections has allowed too many buildings to become unfit for any person to inhabit, particularly the most vulnerable New Yorkers. In 2016, for example, Comptroller Stringer analyzed DOB and HPD violations in buildings that were housing homeless families with children, arguably those most in need of safe and sanitary housing. The analysis found 18,704 open or active violations in these buildings. Violations were most apparent in the “cluster units,” which are privately owned buildings with at least one apartment housing a homeless family. Of these cluster buildings, 238 of 275 (over 85 percent) had at least one open or active immediately hazardous violation, as well as those that are such a threat to life or safety as to warrant immediate corrective action. Ninety-one of these buildings had more than 10 active immediately hazardous violations and 10 had complete or partial vacate orders, meaning that some or all of the building was too unsafe to inhabit. While the City has acted to address the conditions of many of these buildings, the fact that they were allowed to reach such conditions underscores the inadequacy of the existing inspection regime.

DOB and HPD are also falling short when it comes to stopping the tenant harassment that causes long-time residents to be displaced from their homes and communities and makes the city increasingly unaffordable.[5] Indeed, it has been well documented that landlords seeking to remove rent stabilized tenants from their units in order to convert those units to market rate housing often do so by allowing their buildings to become unfit to inhabit.[6] Recent policy changes by the City to enhance resources to prevent tenant harassment and strengthen penalties will help address these problems, but more comprehensive reforms are needed to truly focus City government on enforcement.[7]

To that end, comprehensive reforms are needed to create a City agency focused on inspecting buildings and enforcing our building and housing codes. To do so, the inspection and enforcement functions currently housed in DOB and HPD should be moved into a new Office of Inspection. This Office would be solely focused on inspecting buildings and taking enforcement action to make sure that New York City residents live in housing that is safe, sanitary, and fit to inhabit.

An additional benefit of this proposal is that it will help focus the Department of Buildings on approving building and construction permits in a timely manner. As documented in the Comptroller’s Red Tape Commission Report, the process of getting a building permit from the Department of Buildings is slow and torturous, delaying projects and raising costs.[8] Allowing the agency to focus on that task alone should help it carry out this function more responsibly, helping projects be completed on-time and on-budget.

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The City Charter should be amended to create a new Office of Inspection, which will be responsible for all building and housing inspection and remediation. Such responsibilities should be removed from the Department of Buildings and Department of Housing Preservation and Development so that they can focus more on their other respective responsibilities.

Providing an Independent Budget for Independently Elected Officials

For independently elected officials to be effective they need to have the resources to adequately carry out their duties. At the same time, they must also be able to take positions free from the concern that those positions will negatively impact their funding levels in future years. In New York City, however, independently elected officials rely on the annual budget process for their resources each year. And, because that process is generally controlled by the mayor and the city council, it leaves their agencies open to funding cuts if they take positions at odds with the leadership in City Hall.

Independently elected officials perform a critical role in City government and provide a critical check on mayoral power. Borough Presidents, for instance, are responsible for a range of duties, involving analyzing and making recommendations concerning land use actions, including those proposed by the mayor. Similarly, the Comptroller’s Office conducts independent audits of City agencies, ensures contracts are entered into appropriately, and settles claims filed against City agencies. Likewise, the Public Advocate provides the public with a voice outside of the mayoral administration in matters of city governance.

However, the ability to provide that independent voice is jeopardized when agency resources are slashed. What’s more, even the threat of such action, real or perceived, may be enough to jeopardize independent operations.

There is precedent in the City Charter for providing agencies that are supposed to be independent of the Mayor with the ability to dictate their own budget. Specifically, the City Charter currently provides the Independent Budget Office (IBO) with funding equal to no less than ten percent of the Office of Management and Budget each year. In doing so, the provision ensures that IBO funding levels rise and fall in tandem with the resources available to the government overall, giving IBO the ability to carry out its duties without concern that its actions will jeopardize future funding levels.

Based on this precedent, the City Charter should provide independently elected officials with the ability to set their own budget. Concerns have been raised that providing independent agencies with guaranteed budgets weakens oversight of those agencies, and makes it difficult to increase or decrease budgets, should their mandate evolve.[9] These are important critiques that can be addressed with smart policy reforms.

To do so, the Charter should require that independently elected officials submit budgets directly to the City Council, but only allow the Council to amend those requests to ensure that they are reasonably consistent with overall funding changes across all City agencies or to reflect major changes in responsibility. So, for instance, if overall City agency funding was being reduced by 5 percent from the previous year, then the Council could also modify these budget requests similarly if the budget submission did not already do so.

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The City Charter should be amended to provide City government offices headed by independently elected officials with the ability to set their own budgets. To do so, independently elected officials should submit their budgets directly to the City Council, who would be required to approve those submitted budgets so long as the submission is consistent with any changes in funding levels for all City agencies, unless there was a significant change in the responsibilities of the independently elected official that would also merit an increase or decrease in funding corresponding with those additional or lessened responsibilities.

Adopting Instant Runoff Voting

Voter turnout is a crucial barometer of public participation in government, and its evaluation of governmental performance. When residents go to the polls, they are telling government that they value democratic governance and believe government decisions matter. However, when a significant number of voters stay home on Election Day, their voices are not heard, and they send a message that participation in democratic government does not matter to them.

Based on this measurement, however, New York City government is failing in its obligations to the public. Indeed, in the November 2017 mayoral election, only 1.16 million out of more than 4.57 million actively registered voters—less than 26 percent of all registered voters—cast a ballot. This paltry turnout marked a new low for the city, down from 93 percent turnout in 1953. And, while turnout in the 2017 general election was an all-time low for a general election, it vastly exceeded turnout in the 2017 primary election, when only 12 percent of registered voters went to the polls.[10]

Competitive elections require robust voter participation. While more comprehensive reforms to the election system are sorely needed, the City can start by doing away with the low-turnout, high-expense runoff election that takes place two weeks after the primary if no candidate for mayor, comptroller, or public advocate receives over 40 percent of the vote. Indeed, in the 2013 election for public advocate, the runoff vote that was required cost $13 million and had turnout levels at less than one-third of the primary election held two weeks earlier.[11]

Instant runoff voting, sometimes called ranked choice voting, addresses this challenge by requiring voters to rank candidates in their order of preference during the general election and counting votes in a way that negates the need for a separate runoff election. While there are multiple ways for counting ballots in this type of voting system, as this model has been discussed in the context of New York City, it would work as follows. In an initial count, any candidate receiving more than 50 percent of the vote would be declared the winner. However, if no candidate receives a majority of votes, the two candidates with the most votes would proceed to the next round of counting. The votes cast for the eliminated candidates are then recounted as votes for whichever of the two advancing candidates is ranked higher by each voter. Ultimately, the candidate who receives a majority wins and no runoff election is needed.

Instant runoff voting has been successfully adopted by a number of cities including Minneapolis and Oakland.[12] Most recently, Maine began using instant runoff voting for elections.[13] The idea has been endorsed by good government and other advocacy groups in New York City, has been considered by multiple Charter Review Commissions, and discussed at length in the City Council.[14]

With our city faced by a crisis of civic engagement and voter participation, it is time for the City to move forward with instant runoff voting. While ultimately enacting instant runoff voting for citywide offices may require a change in State law, the City should not wait to do its part to make instant runoff voting a reality.

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The City Charter should be amended to eliminate runoff elections for citywide offices. In its place, the Charter should establish a system of instant runoff voting.

Focusing Efforts to Address Food Insecurity

Food and the eradication of hunger is one of the greatest challenges facing New York City. According to a report from Hunger Free America, between 2014 and 2016 almost 14 percent of New York City residents, or some 1.1 million people, were considered “food insecure.” This means that in one of the world’s richest cities, more than 1 million people could not consistently afford an adequate supply of healthy food. This demographic includes over 340,000 children, or almost 20 percent of all New York City’s youngsters. While the number of children experiencing food insecurity has fallen in recent years, food insecurity for seniors is on the rise.[15] Overall, as reported for 2015, New York City was facing a “meal gap”—meals missing from the table—of 224 million meals.[16]

At the same time, obesity rates increased between 2010 and 2016 in the South Bronx and East/Center Harlem, despite holding steady citywide.[17] Not surprisingly, those neighborhoods with the most dire health indicators are also those where poverty is highest and incomes are the lowest.[18] These inequities extend into the very infrastructure of our city’s food delivery systems: While the total number of grocery stores across the city has grown in recent years, wealthier communities undeniably have more access to supermarkets and the fresh, healthy food options they provide than low-income communities.[19]

The City currently coordinates much of its food policy through the Office of the Director of Food Policy, an office created by Mayor Bloomberg.[20] In addition, Local Law 52 of 2011 requires the Mayor’s Office of Long-Term Planning and Sustainability to publish an annual Food Metrics Report that analyzes the City’s efforts to combat food insecurity. These innovations have brought welcome attention to issues around food instability and local sustainability, but neither advancement has overcome a persistent lack of coordination between the City’s own food initiatives, or to engage other stakeholders outside of government who are committed to creating a healthier, more sustainable food environment for all New Yorkers.

Given the complexity of the problem and the multiplicity of public and private sector stakeholders involved in feeding New York including senior centers, schools, food banks, and more, the City would benefit from the establishment of a stronger coordinating body on food issues. Just as our municipal government oversees transportation, education, and sanitation, so too should it ensure that city residents have access to healthy and sustainable food. The creation of a well-resourced, mayoral agency charged with eliminating hunger would bring more focus, resources, and expertise to the task of creating healthy, sustainable food options for every neighborhood in all five boroughs.

This newly formed Department of Food and Markets would be responsible for coordinating policy and programmatic changes across City agencies, including:

  • Establishing a Food Policy Council designed to bring together diverse constituencies focused on eradicating hunger and creating a healthier, more sustainable food environment in all five boroughs.
  • Creating a comprehensive New York City Food Plan that charts a multi-year strategy for removing inequities in our food system, and developing more robust metrics for measuring progress, similar to what cities like Los Angeles, London and Chicago have already done.
  • Working with the State Department of Agriculture and Markets, the New York State Food Policy Council, and the United States Department of Agriculture to maximize resources and create more and stronger links between upstate farmers and downstate markets.
  • Working with the Health Department to ensure that their goals are consistently conveyed throughout the city by promoting consumption of healthy food by City-funded entities and improving nutrition education in public schools.
  • Fostering economic development by developing job incubator programs in conjunction with an urban agriculture education program to connect job training with the food industry.
  • Promoting and identifying space for additional farmers markets and community gardens, and facilitating the development of rooftop agriculture through enhanced tax incentives and other strategies.
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The City Charter should be reformed to create a Department of Food and Markets, which Comptroller Stringer also recommended in 2010. This Department could consolidate and better coordinate the City’s food policy work that is currently scattered across multiple agencies. It could also promote food-related economic development opportunities, supporting both food retailers and growers while also helping build a stronger regional food economy.

Centralizing and Strengthening Services for Children Citywide

The economic stability, safety, and health of New York City’s 1.8 million children should be City government’s highest priority. But in recent years, City government has failed to adequately serve too many of our most vulnerable children.

The painful reality is that in a city with so much wealth, too many children grow up in challenging circumstances. Ample research shows that the economic uncertainty that comes from living in poverty or experiencing housing instability compromises children’s development and ability to thrive. And yet, almost three in ten children in New York City live in households below the federal poverty level, while each night over 20,000 children go to sleep in a Department of Homeless Services shelter. Moreover, in 2016, almost 5,000 children under 6 tested positive for elevated blood lead levels, while the City’s child welfare agency was placed under a State monitor following a series of failures.

Despite the persistence of poor outcomes, services targeted to children, including subsidized child care, summer camp, and after-school programming, have all too often ended up on the chopping block during annual budget negotiations.[21] New investments have been made in recent years, such as the expansion of universal pre-kindergarten; however, the extent of these problems indicate that much more progress and accountability are needed.

One of the reasons that the City has fallen short is due to inadequate coordination, communication, and planning across the multiple City agencies responsible for implementing children-related policies. These failures have been documented repeatedly in audits and investigations from the Comptroller’s Office and other sources. For instance, a 2018 audit found that the City’s Department of Education was failing to track and monitor the attendance of students living in Department of Homeless Services’ shelters.[22] Similarly, a 2016 investigation found that the City’s Department of Homeless Services, Administration for Children’s Services, and Department of Health and Mental Hygiene were failing to inspect child care centers located in family homeless shelters or share information that would help link children in shelters to child care services.[23] Furthermore, investigations into the failure of the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) to comply with lead-paint requirements reveal that the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene did not consistently notify NYCHA when children living in NYCHA units tested positive for elevated blood lead levels.[24]

While inter-agency coordination is inherently challenging, the fact that these types of problems are so common suggests that the structure of City government is not designed to effectively work across agencies on children’s issues. Currently, multiple officials who report directly to the Mayor are responsible for the various agencies that work on children’s issues. For instance, the Administration for Children’s Services, Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, and Department of Homeless Services report to the Mayor through the Deputy Mayor for Health and Human Services; the Department of Education reports to the Mayor through the Chancellor; and the Department for Youth & Community Development and Pre-K expansion and After-School policy are overseen by the Deputy Mayor for Strategic Policy Initiatives. NYCHA and other agencies with oversight of the built environment report through the Deputy Mayor for Housing and Economic Development. While deputy mayors are the City officials best suited to ensure that agencies are coordinating, issues that require multiple agencies and multiple deputy mayors to address can be difficult to implement even in the best of circumstances.

Recognizing the challenge of coordinating work related to children across multiple agencies and among multiple deputy mayors, Mayor de Blasio created the NYC Children’s Cabinet in 2014 to promote communication and share best practices among City agencies.[25] The NYC Children’s Cabinet, currently chaired by the Deputy Mayor for Health and Human Services, includes commissioners and directors from 24 different City agencies and Mayoral offices and is overseen by an Advisory Board with some three dozen stakeholders representing academia, the judiciary, for-profit and non-profit sectors, all appointed by the mayor.[26] In the current configuration, the Cabinet has no legal, clearly-defined mandate or formal oversight apart from the Mayor, and has relatively few dedicated staff to carry out its worthy mission.

The shortcomings underscore the need for structural reforms to City government to improve inter-agency coordination and provide better oversight of services for children across the five boroughs.

In order to more effectively manage complex issues that cut across the work of multiple agencies, the City Charter establishes a number of offices within the Office of the Mayor focused on specific issues. Examples of these offices include the Office of Criminal Justice, the Office of Immigrant Affairs, and the Office of Nightlife. Similarly, prior to becoming a separate department, the Office of Veterans’ Affairs was also an office housed inside the mayor’s office.

Based on these models, the City Charter should be reformed to create an Office for Children. The Office for Children should be headed by an Executive Director appointed by the Mayor. Like the current NYC Children’s Cabinet, a key goal of this office would be to bolster interagency communication and coordination. To do so, the Charter should require that all relevant City agencies designate among director-level or more senior staff a children’s liaison who would be responsible for working directly with the Office for Children. In addition, the Office would be responsible for helping to implement policies and programs impacting children while also ensuring a child-centered lens is applied to new policy developments. The Office would also be charged with helping to ensure that the budget for children’s programs are adequate.

In order to facilitate these goals and bolster accountability, the Charter should also require that each year, the Office for Children issue a public report describing annual benchmarks City agencies must meet (both individually and collectively), tracking outcomes and evaluating the quality of existing services for children. The report would draw on both qualitative and quantitative methods as well as build on and consolidate those child-related performance indicators already outlined in the annual Mayor’s Management Report. These include such indicators as immunization rates, blood lead levels, asthma-related medical visits, maltreatment in foster care, and rates of homelessness. Overarching benchmarks that relate to the quality of life for New York City children, including their economic security, safety, and health, and that cut across the work of multiple agencies should be included. The Office’s Executive Director will have discretion to set these, in partnership with the Advisory Council (described below), but they may include indicators of poverty, residential segregation, food insecurity, and obesity. The Office’s Executive Director must seek community input during the process of completing the report.

The Charter should supplement the Office for Children with a Children’s Advisory Council that would be tasked with providing independent advice to the Mayor and City Council on how to improve policies and programs that impact children. Similar types of advisory bodies exist across City government, including both the Office of Nightlife and the then-Office of Veterans’ Affairs. To promote its independence, the Children’s Advisory Council should be modeled on the existing Nightlife Advisory Board for which a majority of members are appointed by the Council Speaker rather than the Mayor.

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The City Charter should be amended to create an Office for Children, a new office within the Mayoralty charged with facilitating coordination between agencies serving children and providing oversight of all children’s services. The Executive Director of the Office, with the assistance of designated liaisons at every relevant City agency, will annually set benchmarks, track outcomes, and report on the quality of services for children. The City Charter should further be amended to create a Children’s Advisory Council to provide independent analysis and recommendation to the Mayor and the City Council on ways to improve City policies relating to children.

Providing Quality, Affordable Child Care to Working Families

The City’s affordability crisis extends beyond the lack of affordable housing. Indeed, one of the most significant expenses many families face is child care. Today in New York City, a spot in a child care center for an infant costs more than $19,000, nearly three times more than one year of in-state tuition at the City University of New York, and 53.3 percent more than the cost of a spot for a four-year-old.[27]

At the same time, a substantial body of research has established that a child’s earliest years are the most critical to their development; 80 percent of brain development is complete by the time a child turns three.[28] Despite the importance of high-quality care for our youngest children, the City spends roughly five times more on child care and pre-kindergarten for three- and four-year-olds than on child care for children under three.[29]

The expansion of universal pre-kindergarten has helped ensure that all four-year-olds in New York City have access to quality early childhood education, and the steps that have been taken to provide universal pre-kindergarten to three-year-olds will bring added relief to families across the boroughs. Still, working families with children under four are faced with the daunting task of trying to find quality care that meets their needs and that they can afford. Only one in seven children whose families are eligible for a subsidy to help pay for child care actually receives one.

Making our city more affordable for all families requires us to provide better solutions for families with young children. And while additional resources for child care are needed, there are also structural changes that can be made to City government to better serve families. Currently, the City’s child care services are split between multiple agencies, including the Department of Education, which will soon oversee the City’s EarlyLearn program, and the Administration for Children’s Services, which previously oversaw EarlyLearn and administers child care vouchers.

These operations could be streamlined, and service delivery improved for families, if all public child care operations were consolidated under one office. Moving child care vouchers entirely out of the Administration for Children’s Services will also provide the benefits of sharpening the agency’s focus on protective services and improving oversight of subsidized child care quality.

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The City Charter should be changed to create an Office of Child Care, a new office to oversee subsidized child care housed at the Department of Education. As part of doing so, provisions of the Charter that require the Administration for Children’s Services to provide child care services should be removed, which will also help to better align that agency’s focus on preventive and protective services.

Eliminating the Commission on Public Information and Communication

Section 1061 and 1062 of the Charter create the Commission on Public Information and Communication (COPIC) composed of representatives selected by the Public Advocate, the Corporation Counsel, certain City agencies, the president of WNYC, and a member of the City Council. Created in the 1989 Charter Review process, COPIC has a number of functions including educating the public about City-produced information, reviewing how the City provides information to the public, facilitating public access to City agencies, and making recommendations to improve City technology and data policies. In addition, COPIC is supposed to issue annual reports on data that City agencies possess that is publicly available and advise the City on how to improve public access to information.

However, COPIC rarely meets and has not been active in recent years. In fact, according to its twitter page, the Commission has not convened since March 2016 and has met on fewer than 10 occasions during its almost 30-year history.[30]

Even if it had been active, however, the reality is that changes in the last thirty years have made COPIC obsolete. For instance, Local Law 11 of 2012, the City’s open data law, requires City data to be published on a single website, and subsequent amendments to the law have required data to be kept up-to-date and for the City to publish data dictionaries for all data sets.[31] The Mayor’s Office of Data Analytics, an office which did not exist in 1989, now publishes an annual report on the City’s work to implement the open data law.[32] Similarly, Local Law 103 of 2013 requires all public meetings to be webcast and archived on the agency website, improving public access to government meetings.[33]

Consequently, based on its lack of activity and the reforms enacted since 1989, COPIC should be eliminated. To be sure, eliminating COPIC should not be taken as an excuse for the City to reduce public access to information. However, with all the changes that have been made, a separate commission like COPIC is outdated.

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The City Charter should be amended to eliminate the Commission on Public Information and Communication.

Improving the Comptroller’s Office Operations

In carrying out its official duties and functions, the Office of the Comptroller has identified a number of inconsistencies within our City’s government that should be addressed as part of a comprehensive review of the City Charter. In some cases, these reforms are little more than technical clarifications to address inconsistencies in City and State law. In others, however, these proposals would either add to or subtract from the Comptroller’s existing authority to improve the operations of City government and result in better outcomes for taxpayers.

Clarify the Comptroller’s Electronic Fund Transfer Authority

In recent years, the City has moved from paying its vendors with paper checks to encouraging the use of electronic funds transfers. Doing so allows the City to make payments to vendors more quickly and guards against risks that checks are lost in the mail. This has allowed the City to modernize its operations, but the Charter has not kept up with these changes.

Currently, vendors doing business with the City are able to enroll and view the status of payments through the NYC Payee Information Portal, which is overseen by the Comptroller’s Office. But to receive electronic payments, vendors must submit required documentation to the Department of Finance, after enrolling as a vendor with our Office. This creates additional work for vendors, making interaction with the City a frustrating process.

To improve this process, the power to approve electronic funds for vendors should be housed exclusively in the Comptroller’s office. Doing so would make the Comptroller’s Office the “one-stop-shop” for these vendors, making it easier to do business with the City.

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The City Charter should further be amended to clarify that each agency head should appoint an agency Chief Diversity Officer, whose full-time responsibility would be overseeing agency implementation of the M/WBE program along with tracking and measuring diverse talent for the agency.

Remove Uncertainty in the Selection of an Outside Auditor

The City Charter requires the City’s accounts to be audited annually by an outside auditor. However, the Charter’s mandate and the City’s procurement rules create an inconsistent structure in selecting that outside auditor.

Specifically, section 97 of the Charter creates an Audit Committee of officials who are required to “select a firm or firms of certified public accountants to perform the annual audit of the city’s accounts.” At the same time, the City’s Procurement Policy Board Rules require the creation of a separate Evaluation Committee, composed of individuals knowledgeable about the City’s finances, to review bid proposals and select an outside auditor.

In order to maintain a fair and competitive process that leads to the selection of the most experienced and qualified firm to do the job, there must be a clear distinction between the role of the Audit Committee and the Evaluation Committee. As a consequence, the Charter should be revised to clarify that the Audit Committee advises on the selection of the outside auditor. This change would ensure that the duties of each are well-defined without contradicting one another. When the Audit Committee selects an outside auditor different from the Evaluation Committee, this presents a challenge for the stakeholders of the audit as the City could end up working with a firm that may not be up to par whether in performance, organizational capacity or technical requirements.

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The City Charter should be revised to indicate that the Audit Committee may advise on the selection of the firm or firms of certified public accountants to perform the annual audit of the City’s accounts. This will ensure that the individuals involved in the audit, and part of the bid proposal review and interview process governed by Citywide procurement rules, will be the only ones charged with the responsibility of selecting the City’s independent auditors.

Ensure Proper Oversight in the Creation of Component Units

The Comptroller’s Office is responsible for overseeing the City’s finances. In order to do so, it is critical that the Office provide accurate information to the public, including bondholders and other stakeholders who rely on a complete picture of the City’s finances when making decisions. However, gaps exist in the process by which the Comptroller’s Office is informed about all entities that may be legally separate from the City, but create a financial benefit to the City and should thus be part of the City’s financial statements. Without knowledge of these entities, it is difficult for the Comptroller to produce complete financial statements for the public.

Specifically, entities that are part of the City’s financial reporting entity are known as Component Units. These organizations are part of the City’s financial statements and in whole or in part rely on the City’s resources, or City officials make up a majority of its governing body.

However, the Comptroller is not required to approve their creation, nor is the Comptroller’s Bureau of Accountancy formally notified when they are established. The risk of missing or not including an entity that meets the requirement to be part of the City’s reporting entity could be addressed if the Charter required that the Comptroller’s Office approve the creation of an entity affiliated with the City that may have an impact on the City’s audited financial statement.

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The City Charter should be amended to require the Comptroller to approve the creation of any entity affiliated with the City of New York that could impact the City’s audited financial statement prior to that entity being created.

Clarify the Comptroller’s Duties by Eliminating References to the Board of Estimate

If good government is to mean anything, a municipality’s governing laws on the books—available to all to review—should be readily accessible and reflect operative rules. The laws should not include decades-old arcana. Yet, almost 30 years after the Board of Estimate was found unconstitutional, the City Charter is still riddled with references to the Board of Estimate. That the Board of Estimate is still referenced in the Charter has created a lack of clarity as to the specific powers and duties of the Comptroller. The Charter should be revised in the following ways to address these weaknesses.

34
The City Charter should be amended to provide the Comptroller with the authority to cancel not-for-profit corporations’ overdue real property taxes. Currently, the Comptroller’s authority to do so is not spelled out in the Charter, but rather is the result of that power devolving from the power granted to the Board of Estimate. As a result, there is ambiguity regarding whether the Comptroller’s Office or the Department of Finance has the authority to cancel such back taxes for non-profit corporations. In practice, the Department of Finance reviews requests to cancel tax assessments for the current tax year and pervious tax year while the Comptroller reviews requests to cancel taxes assessed before the previous tax year. The Charter should formalize and clarify this practice.
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The City Charter should be amended to clarify that the Comptroller’s Office has the authority to settle illegal but equitable claims. On occasion, a vendor will perform work for the City when no contract for that service has been registered. If that vendor files a claim against the City for payment on the performance of their work not covered by a registered contract, the City could contend that the claim was invalid as a result of there not being a legal agreement between the City and the vendor. However, as a practice, the Comptroller’s Office will settle such claims when there is no doubt that the City received the benefit of the work performed by the vendor. This power has devolved to the Comptroller from the Board of Estimate, but is not explicitly granted in the Charter. Amending the Charter to provide the Comptroller’s Office with this explicit duty would add clarity.

Clarify the Comptroller’s Prevailing Wage Enforcement Responsibilities

Currently, there is a significant discrepancy between state and local law in regard to the Comptroller’s duties to audit and investigate City contractors and City financial assistance recipients for prevailing wage and living wage violations. While State law provides the Comptroller with this authority in the context of its prevailing wage law, a 2004 court decision stripped the authority from the Comptroller to audit, investigate, and take action against contractors for prevailing wage violations under City law. Addressing this discrepancy would ensure that the Comptroller’s Office could effectively enforce local prevailing and living wage laws that are vital to the protection of working New Yorkers.

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The City Charter should be amended to clarify that the Comptroller’s Office has the power to audit and investigate City contractors and recipients of City financial assistance for prevailing and living wage violations under local law.

Fix Inconsistencies in the Consideration of Claims Arising from Capital Construction Projects

The City Charter currently provides the Comptroller’s Office with the authority to settle and adjust claims against the City. This power includes claims filed as a result of disputes during contracts, including construction projects that are governed by the dispute resolution provisions in the Procurement Policy Board Rules. However, the Charter also permits the City to include provisions in contracts for capital construction projects authorizing the Comptroller’s Office to submit disputes arising under such contracts to be settled through arbitration. This is inconsistent with both the City’s Procurement Policy Board rules that provide for a specific dispute resolution process that does not include outside arbitration and the Comptroller’s general authority to settle and adjust contract dispute claims. Addressing this inconsistency would clarify the Comptroller’s authority and ensure alignment in government operations.

37
The City Charter should be amended to clarify that the Comptroller’s authority to settle and adjust claims extends to claims filed as a result of contract disputes. The Charter should further be amended to prevent claims resulting from construction contracts or capital projects from being addressed through arbitration.

Require Money Borrowed to Finance Housing Development to be Used for Housing Development

A basic principle enshrined in the City Charter is that debt should not be used to finance the operating expenses of local government. However, in contravention of this principle, the City can and does borrow money, lends it for housing, secures the loan with a mortgage, sells the mortgage to a City-controlled entity (that in turn sells bonds to buy the loan), and then uses the sales proceeds for operating expenses. These transactions convert capital borrowing for housing into expense budget funding, and leaves two sets of taxable bonds outstanding for the same assets. While this appears legal under existing law, it is a poor use of City resources and a missed opportunity to increase funding for affordable housing, without further increasing the City’s debt burden.

38
The City Charter should be amended to stipulate that proceeds from the sale of assets that were created or acquired with debt of the City (or of a City-controlled authority or local development corporation) be applied either to reduce the principal outstanding of such debt or to fund other City capital projects of comparable useful life.

Remove the Charter’s Reference to Debarred Contractors

The City Charter should be updated to the remove language referring to the City’s debarment of contractors. In 2001, the New York City Council repealed the City’s power to debar contractors, yet the language which the City used to exercise this power still exists in the Charter. To ensure that the Charter is accurate and reflects the current state of the law, the language should be removed or replaced with language that refers solely to debarment actions taken by applicable New York State and federal agencies.

39
The City Charter should be amended to reflect that the City no longer has the authority to debar contractors.

Clarify and Improve the Authority of the Comptroller’s Bureau of Contract Administration

A number of technical reforms to the City Charter would improve and clarify the authority of the Comptroller’s Bureau of Contract Administration. First, the City Charter should be amended to include the definition of “registration,” as currently codified in the Procurement Policy Board Rules. Doing so would provide clarity that the Charter is currently lacking. In addition, the City Charter should be amended to add the authority to issue accounting directives related to capital and expense encumbrance requests so that there is a standard set of rules for City agencies to follow when encumbering funds. Finally, as a condition to receiving City capital or expense funds, the City Charter should be amended to require non-mayoral entities to post their own procurement rules in a conspicuous location on their own websites. Doing so would ensure that the Comptroller’s Office could understand the process by which City funds are expended.

40
The City Charter should be amended to clarify the authority of the Comptroller’s Bureau of Contract Administration by defining the term registration, giving the Comptroller the authority to issue accounting directives around encumbrance requests, and requiring non-mayoral agencies to publicly disclose their procurement rules.

Require the Inclusion of Certificates to Proceed for Capital Projects in Agency’s Registration Submission Package

The City Charter should be amended to codify the existing practice that City agencies present Certificates to Proceed for capital projects issued by the Office of Management and Budget at the time of registration. In addition to codifying existing practice, this change will help make sure the Comptroller can effectively carry out its responsibility to ensure that there is an appropriation of funds sufficient to pay a contract before registering.

41
The City Charter should be amended to require that City agencies provide Certificates to Proceed as part of their contract registration submission to the Comptroller.

[1] “Hack Attacks on City Computers,” WNYC, April 20, 2015: https://www.wnyc.org/story/hack-attacks-city-computers/.

[2] “Six days after a ransomware cyberattack, Atlanta officials are filling out forms by hand,” CNN, March 8, 2018: https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/27/us/atlanta-ransomware-computers/index.html.

[3] “13 major data breaches, hacks in the last year you need to know about,” NJ.com, April 18, 2018: https://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2018/04/these_13_data_breaches_may_have_affected_you_in_th.html. The Council of Economic Advisors, “The Costs of Malicious Cyber Activity to the U.S. Economy,” February 2018: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/The-Cost-of-Malicious-Cyber-Activity-to-the-U.S.-Economy.pdf.

[4] Executive Order No. 28, July 11, 2017: https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/home/downloads/pdf/executive-orders/2017/eo_28.pdf.

[5] “New Package of Bills Aims to Stop Tenant Harassment in NYC,” Next City, June 9, 2017: https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/nyc-bills-stop-tenant-harassment-bad-landlords.

[6] “Stabilizing NYC: The Predatory Equity Story,” Urban Justice Center, 2017: https://cdp.urbanjustice.org/sites/default/files/CDP.WEB.doc_Report_SNYCPredatoryEquity_20171214_0.pdf.

[7] “Your Key to NYC: Mayor de Blasio Announces Largest Year for Affordable Housing Production in City’s History,” July 19, 2018: https://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/362-18/your-key-nyc-mayor-de-blasio-largest-year-affordable-housing-production-city-s#/0. “Mayor de Blasio Signs 18 Bills Strengthening Legal Protections for Tenants,” August 30, 2017: https://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/570-17/mayor-de-blasio-signs-18-bills-strengthening-legal-protections-tenants.

[8] New York City Comptroller, “Red Tape Commission: 60 Ways to Cut Red Tape and Help Small Businesses Grow,” July 2016: https://comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/RedTapeReport.pdf.

[9] Testimony by Courtney Wolf, Research Associate Citizens Budget Commission, New York City Charter Revision Commission Public Hearing, August 2, 2010: https://cbcny.org/sites/default/files/TESTIMONY_08022010.pdf.

[10] Board of Elections, the City of New York, “Annual Report 2017:” http://vote.nyc.ny.us/downloads/pdf/documents/boe/AnnualReports/BOEAnnualReport17.pdf.

[11] New York City Comptroller, “Barriers to the Ballot: Voting Reform in New York City,” April 2016: https://comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-content/uploads/documents/reform_the_vote_report.pdf.

[12] “Ranked Choice Voting / Instant Runoff,” FairVote.org: http://www.fairvote.org/rcv#where_is_ranked_choice_voting_used.

[13] “Main voters blew up their voting system and started from scratch,” Vox.com, June 12, 2018: https://www.vox.com/2018/6/12/17448450/maine-ranked-choice-voting-paul-lepage-instant-runoff-2018-midterms.

[14] “Final Report of the 2010 New York City Charter Revision Commission,” August 23, 2010: http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/charter/downloads/pdf/final_report_2010_charte_revision_9-1-10.pdf. New York City Council, Int. 1192-2013: http://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=1520859&GUID=54905EAC-7C64-48AE-982E-3C88F8D8C316&Options=ID|Text|&Search=runoff. 2018 NYC Charter Revision Commission Public Hearing, June 12, 2018: https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/charter/downloads/pdf/06_12_18_NYC_Charter_Commission_Hearing.pdf. 2018 Charter Revision Commission Resolution, August 14, 2018: https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/charter/downloads/pdf/Resolution-Aug-14-2018.pdf.

[15] “Working New York Still Hungry: New York City and State Hunger Report,” Hunger Free America, November 2017: https://www.hungerfreeamerica.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/2017%20NY%20City%20and%20State%20Annual%20Hunger%20Survey%20Report%20.pdf.

[16] New York City Food Policy, “Food Metrics Report, 2017:” http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/foodpolicy/downloads/pdf/2017-Food-Metrics-Report-Corrected.pdf

[17] New York City Community Health Survey: https://a816-healthpsi.nyc.gov/epiquery/.

[18] “New York City’s Meal Gap, 2016 Trends Report,” Food Bank for New York City: https://www.foodbanknyc.org/wp-content/uploads/Meal-Gap-Trends-Report-2016.pdf.

[19] New York City Comptroller, “New York City Neighborhood Economic Profiles:” https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/new-york-city-neighborhood-economic-profiles/#InteractiveChart

[20] “Innovations in NYC Health & Human Services Policy: Food Policy,” Urban Institute, February 2014: https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/32636/413054-Innovations-in-NYC-Health-and-Human-Services-Policy-Food-Policy.PDF.

[21] “Council Members, Youth, Providers and Advocates Rally at City Hall to Save Summer Programs for Over 34,000 Middle-School Students and After-School Programs for 9,000 Elementary School Children,” June 11, 2018: https://www.cccnewyork.org/press/releases/council-members-youth-providers-and-advocates-rally-at-city-hall-to-save-summer-programs-for-over-34000-middle-school-students-and-after-school-programs-for-9000-elementary-school-children/.

[22] New York City Comptroller, “Audit Report on the Department of Education’s Efforts to Monitor and Address School Attendance of Homeless Children Residing in Shelters,” March 15, 2018: https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/audit-report-on-the-department-of-educations-efforts-to-monitor-and-address-school-attendance-of-homeless-children-residing-in-shelters/3/.

[23] New York City Comptroller, “An Investigation into the Provision of Child Care Services in New York City Homeless Shelters,” October 26, 2016: https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/an-investigation-into-the-provision-of-child-care-services-in-new-york-city-homeless-shelters/.

[24] “NYCHA nightmare: More than 800 kids tainted by lead, de Blasio administration finally concedes,” The New York Daily News, June 30, 2018: http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/ny-metro-nycha-lead-20180621-story.html.

[25] “Mayor de Blasio Announces the New York City Children’s Cabinet,” April 7, 2014: https://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/132-14/mayor-de-blasio-the-new-york-city-children-s-cabinet

[26] https://www1.nyc.gov/site/childrenscabinet/about/advisory-board.page.

[27] Estimates of the cost of child care derived from New York State Office of Child and Family Services 2016 market rates: https://ocfs.ny.gov/main/policies/external/OCFS_2016/LCMs/16-OCFS-LCM-18.pdf; http://www2.cuny.edu/financial-aid/tuition-and-college-costs/tuition-fees/#1452179204200-d27abe14-99f4.

[28] http://www.urbanchildinstitute.org/why-0-3/baby-and-brain

[29] Comptroller’s Office analysis of Mayor Bill de Blasio, Adopted Budget Fiscal Year 2018 Supporting Schedules (June 2017); Citizens’ Committee for Children of New York, Inc., Keeping Track of New York City’s Children: 2017 (November 2017); Mayor Bill de Blasio, Mayor’s Management Report (September 2017), http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/operations/downloads/pdf/mmr2017/2017_mmr.pdf. Analysis includes spending on Head Start, child care, and universal pre-kindergarten.

[30] “City’s transparency commission quietly resurfaces,” Crain’s New York, December 18, 2014: http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20141219/BLOGS04/141219821/citys-transparency-commission-quietly-resurfaces. @COPICNYC twitter account: https://twitter.com/copicnyc?lang=en.

[31] NYC Open Data: https://opendata.cityofnewyork.us/open-data-law/.

[32] New York City, “Open Data for All 2017 Progress Report,” https://moda-nyc.github.io/2017-Open-Data-Report/.

[33] New York City Council Int. 0132-2010, http://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=657961&GUID=7880F746-C597-416E-BD20-43175D0CD616&Options=ID%7cText%7c&Search=103.

$242 billion
Aug
2022