A Framework for Structural NYPD Overtime Reform

Executive Summary

Overtime spending has been a persistent budget challenge in New York City for more than a decade, rising from $1.66 billion in FY 2015 to $2.71 billion in FY 2025. The New York City Police Department (NYPD) accounts for approximately 40% of annual overtime cost  contributing both to the overall level of overtime spending and to recurring gaps between adopted budgets and actual expenses. This report analyzes NYPD uniformed overtime, where it is concentrated, and whether recent governance changes have materially changed the Department’s overtime trajectory.

NYPD uniformed overtime spending has moderated in FY 2026 relative to FY 2025’s record breaking peak, but remains historically high. The NYC Comptroller’s Office estimates spending at approximately $890 million for FY 2026 which would be the third-highest year on record, behind only FY 2024 and FY 2025, and approximately $287 million above the FY 2013 – FY 2023 average of $603 million.

NYPD uniformed overtime is not driven solely by unexpected events. The most recent quarterly category data analyzed for this report, covering October–December 2025, shows that substantial overtime remains concentrated in foreseeable deployments, especially Planned Events– parades, details, and quality of life initiatives.

NYPD uniformed overtime is no longer a marginal variance around budget assumptions. In FY 2025, uniformed overtime reached $960 million, the highest level on record in nominal dollars, and for the third consecutive year actual spending exceeded the adopted level by more than double.  The Mayor’s FY 2027 Executive Budget includes additional funding to address chronic underbudgeting, including NYPD uniformed overtime shortfalls. However, the NYC Comptroller’s Office finds that while the added funding moves the budget closer to expected need, it still does not fully cover projected overtime spending.

Key Findings

The findings in this report indicate that recurring and foreseeable deployments should be subject to staffing plans, scheduling discipline, documented approval criteria, and after-action review rather than routine overtime reliance.

• NYPD uniformed overtime is expected to reach $890 million in FY 2026. That would be approximately 7% below FY 2025 record breaking $960 million, but it would still be the third-highest year on record and approximately $287 million above the FY 2013–FY 2023 average of $603 million.
• Over the last three consecutive fiscal years, NYPD’s actual uniformed overtime spending was more than double its adopted uniformed overtime budget each year.
• Recent fiscal years are persistently high relative to NYPD’s longer-run baseline.

NYPD Uniformed Overtime Is Concentrated in Foreseeable Deployments, Including Planned Events and “Quality-of-Life Initiatives.”

A substantial share of Event/Details overtime is attributable to Planned Events, which are, by definition, foreseeable. When foreseeable categories dominate this overtime, the issue is not primarily unpredictability; it is how NYPD chooses to staff recurring deployments.

• Planned Events accounted for approximately 57% of Event/Details spending for quarter two 2026 ($46.1 million total).
• Planned Events overtime increased across the same three fiscal years in which NYPD ultimately more than doubled its adopted overtime budget, rising from $97.1 million in FY 2023 to $110.4 million in FY 2024 to $115.7 million in FY 2025.

Recent Governance Changes Are Steps Toward Stronger Oversight, but FY 2025 Outcomes and FY 2026 Projections Show Additional Steps May Be Necessary.

• NYPD implemented an overtime plan effective January 1, 2025, and described steps intended to improve accountability and reduce overtime reliance. Those changes reflected movement toward stronger governance, and updated FY 2026 data suggests some moderation relative to FY 2025’s peak. However, continued overtime spending suggests that the reforms have not yet substantially reduced overtime. The Department’s January 2025 plan introduced thresholds, documentation requirements, and compliance roles, but it did not establish enforceable fatigue and scheduling protections that would directly mitigate known safety and performance risks associated with extended work hours.
• FY 2025 outcomes show that reforms must operate at the level of command accountability, audit-ready compliance, and deployment redesign, particularly for foreseeable overtime drivers.
• Transparency requirements exist but have not, on their own, resolved the underlying drivers of overtime. NYC Administrative Code § 14-150 requires NYPD to provide quarterly overtime reports to the New York City Council and post them on its website within 30 days after the end of the reporting period. However, NYPD’s public posting practices have not consistently supported timely quarter-by-quarter oversight.

Recommendations

The recommendations below are designed to strengthen governance and auditability, curb extreme overtime concentration among repeat outliers, as well as reduce foreseeable drivers of overtime that should be planned and staffed without overtime as the default.

Manage fatigue risk and prevent harm from excessive hours.

To better align with OIG-NYPD recommendations, NYPD should expand the current overtime plan into an enforceable fatigue risk management policy that treats fatigue as a core operational risk rather than a secondary workforce issue. NYPD’s formal written policy should:

1. Establish minimum rest periods following extended tours and mandatory overtime, with documented exceptions.
2. Codify and strengthen NYPD’s existing officer-level overtime thresholds by establishing maximum allowable consecutive hours and consecutive days with overtime, with enhanced approval for deviations.
3. Require quarterly reporting on rest-rule compliance, exceptions by command, and corrective actions for repeat noncompliance.

Strengthen command-level accountability for recurring overtime overages.

A threshold-and-explanation model can identify overages, but recurring overages require formal, structured remediation. NYPD’s formal written policy should:

4. Require a written corrective action plan for commands that exceed thresholds for two consecutive quarters or in three quarters within a fiscal year, including root-cause analysis, specific operational changes, responsible personnel, and a timeline for compliance.
5. Require written plans to identify which categories are driving overtime, such as planned events, arrests, investigations, training, and other drivers.
6. Publish whether each command met its reduction targets in the following two quarters.

Build an independent, auditable compliance and oversight function.

Compliance roles located solely within commands risk becoming procedural rather than corrective unless they are independent, auditable, and tied to measurable outcomes. NYPD’s formal written policy should:

7. Establish a standardized audit protocol and require quarterly audits of a sample of overtime approvals and documentation across commands that is conducted by personnel outside the command being audited.
8. Establish a formal repeat-overage escalation pathway that supplements existing command-level compliance monitoring by requiring written senior review and written corrective action when the same command repeatedly exceeds thresholds.
9. Publish an annual summary of audit findings, including missing documentation, error rates, and corrective actions, with command-level accountability.

Make overtime reporting timely, complete, and decision-useful.

Public reporting can improve transparency, but it should also be usable for management and oversight. NYPD’s formal written policy should:

10. NYPD should adopt a standardized quarterly overtime reporting template that goes beyond the minimum information currently required, including clear definitions, complete hours-and-dollars data, recurring outlier tables, and published overtime hours and spending by category and major operational units.
11. Add a recurring outlier section identifying commands with the highest overtime, fastest growth, and repeated overage explanations.
12. Post each quarterly overtime report by the deadline required under NYC Administrative Code § 14-150, in a machine-readable format, and keep postings current through the most recently completed quarter.

Reduce predictable drivers of overtime.

Planned events are generally scheduled in advance and therefore largely foreseeable. NYPD’s formal written policy should:

13. Require written pre-event staffing plans and post-event after-action reviews that prioritize scheduled coverage, compare planned staffing to actual overtime use, and document justification when overtime is used.
14. Track planned-event overtime as a distinct performance metric for commands and bureaus.
15. Identify recurring events that reliably generate overtime and redesign standard staffing templates to reduce overtime dependence.
16. On a quarterly basis identify posts, fixed assignments, and backfill practices that systematically generate overtime and redesign them with written measurable savings targets.

Reduce extreme overtime concentration among repeat outliers.

Highly concentrated overtime can signal preventable scheduling failures, weak approvals, or elevated abuse risk. NYPD’s formal written policy should:

17. Identify posts, fixed assignments, and backfill practices that systematically generate overtime and redesign them with measurable savings targets.
18. Require a mitigation plan for repeat outliers, such as rotation, schedule redesign, or staffing changes, rather than recurring approvals.

Background

Overtime spending has been a persistent and material budget issue for New York City for more than a decade, rising from $1.66 billion in FY 2015 to $2.71 billion in FY 2025. Within citywide overtime, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) is a major driver of both City spending levels and budget-to-actual variance. The NYC Comptroller Office’s March 2023 Overtime Overview report noted that NYPD uniformed overtime spending accounted for $671 million in FY 2022, representing 43% of total uniformed overtime costs that year.[1] Concerns about NYPD overtime are not limited to fiscal stewardship. On May 3, 2023, the Department of Investigation’s Office of the Inspector General for the NYPD (OIG-NYPD) issued Overtime Under Review: NYPD Overtime and the Increased Risk of Negative Policing Outcomes, which examined the relationship between overtime hours and multiple “Negative Policing Outcomes,” including lawsuits, substantiated Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB) complaints, uses of force indicators, vehicle collisions, workplace injuries, and other sources of liability risk.[2]

Transparency requirements exist but have not, on their own, resolved the underlying drivers of overtime. NYC Administrative Code § 14-150 requires NYPD to provide any available quarterly overtime reports to the New York City Council, and post the reports on its website, within 30 days of the end of the reporting period. [3] However, NYPD’s public posting practices remain incomplete and inconsistent with timely quarter-by-quarter oversight. Although this report reviewed FY 2026 Q2 overtime category data for October–December 2025, NYPD has not kept its own public archive current in a clear and timely manner on its website, forcing oversight bodies to rely on other channels to obtain recent quarterly data. For example, as of February 3, 2026, NYPD’s public archive extended only through the April-June 2025 overtime report, even though more recent overtime reporting had been provided through other channels. As a result, the July-September 2025 report was still not publicly available more than three months after the statutory posting deadline.

Overview of NYPD’s Recent Developments

In December 2024, then-Mayor Eric Adams issued Mayoral Directive 2024-1, directing NYPD and the City’s other major uniformed agencies to implement additional overtime control procedures.[4] The directive requires each agency to strengthen overtime governance through measures such as enhanced monitoring, compliance and accountability mechanisms, and tighter management of overtime usage and approvals. These types of management and accountability measures are proven to work. Chicago’s Office of Inspector General audit of Chicago Police Department overtime controls reflects the kind of oversight approach that tracks not only whether overtime policies exist, but whether corrective actions are implemented over time. Mayoral Directive 2024-1 similarly establishes an important governance foundation by requiring stronger monitoring, compliance, and accountability mechanisms for overtime usage and approvals. For NYPD, the central oversight question is whether those mechanisms produce standardized documentation, defined corrective actions when thresholds are exceeded, and reporting sufficient to assess compliance and outcomes.

In December 2025, The Office of the NYC Comptroller reported that there seems to have been some success in achieving the directive’s goal.[5] That trend appears to have continued through the beginning of 2026, as NYPD’s monthly uniformed overtime spending over the prior 13 months averaged approximately $6 million lower than the monthly average in FY 2024. However, the Executive Budget analysis now projects NYPD uniformed overtime spending at approximately $890 million in FY 2026.[i] While this would still be lower than the $960 million spent in FY 2025, it is still higher than the Preliminary Budget projection $866 million and would remain historically elevated.

Then-Mayor Adams appointed Jessica Tisch as NYPD Commissioner in November 2024. At the same time, the Department entered FY 2025 amid heightened scrutiny of overtime controls following the resignation of Chief of Department Jeffrey Maddrey and public reporting concerning potential overtime-related misconduct, highlighting that NYPD’s overtime challenges were not only a budget management issue but also an internal-controls issue that was undermining public trust.[6]

Publicly, Commissioner Tisch described steps intended to reduce overtime reliance and improve accountability. This included transferring “nearly 1,000 officers” from desk assignments back into transit, housing, and patrol commands, and putting a “uniform overtime plan” in place starting January 1, 2025, with thresholds, documentation requirements, and overtime compliance officers in each command.[7] However, in the April 1, 2025 Eleventh Annual Report, OIG-NYPD found that the updated policies did not address officer fatigue safeguards, stating that “the policies do not address mandatory time off, rest periods after long shifts or mandatory overtime, or provide guidance to commanding officers on methods of shift scheduling for purpose of mitigating officer fatigue.”[8]  Those recommendations were not adopted.[ii][9]

Analysis of NYPD Overtime

NYPD Uniformed Overtime Reached a Record in FY 2025 and Remains Historically High in FY 2026.

Historically, the NYPD overtime trend has shown a persistent disconnect between what is budgeted at adoption and what is ultimately spent. The FY 2027 Executive Budget reflects a shift toward comparatively more realistic budgeting for chronically underbudgeted costs, including overtime. However, the budget still does not fully account for projected overtime need, and comparatively, more realistic budgeting does not itself reduce overtime usage.

The Office of the NYC Comptroller projects approximately $890 million for FY overtime 2026, which would be the third-highest year on record, behind only FY 2024 and FY 2025. That would be approximately $70 million below FY 2025, but still approximately $287 million above the FY 2013 – FY 2023 average of $603 million.

Through preliminary May FY 2026 data, NYPD had already spent approximately $769 million in uniformed overtime, reflecting high monthly spending across much of the fiscal year, including $101 million in May, $96 million in November, $82 million in September, $79 million in October, and $73 million in August. While monthly spending slightly declined in the months immediately following the December 2025 directive, even with some annual wage increases, but the decline from FY 2025 has been uneven, and preliminary May data shows spending rising again. FY 2026 spending was higher than the same month in FY 2025 in January, February, and May, increasing from $58 million to $61 million in January, from $53 million to $54 million in February, and from $97 million to $101 million in preliminary May data.

Figure 1: NYPD Uniformed Overtime Monthly Spending, FY 2024, FY 2025, and Year-to-Date FY 2026

Source: Office of the New York City Comptroller, NYC Financial Management System (FMS)

Figure 1 shows that FY 2026 month-to-month uniformed overtime spending has moderated relative to FY 2025’s peak months, but continues to reflect substantial monthly spending. The broader fiscal-year data shows that NYPD overtime spending has consistently exceeded the adopted budget, especially in recent years. In each of the last three completed fiscal years, NYPD spent more than double its adopted uniformed overtime budget: $821 million against $372 million adopted in FY 2023, $955 million against $437 million adopted in FY 2024, and $960 million against $478 million adopted in FY 2025.

Figure 2: Adopted Budget, FY 2027 Executive Budget, and Future Projections

Source: Office of the New York City Comptroller, Mayor’s Office of Management and Budget

Figure 2 shows the longstanding gap between adopted overtime funding and actual spending, as well as the FY 2027 Budget’s shift toward comparatively more realistic funding levels that still do not fully account for projected overtime need. Recent contractual raises, including uniformed pattern wage increases of 18.8% for the latest collective bargaining round, likely increased the dollar cost of each overtime hour. However, the 18.8% increases alone do not account for the scale of recent overtime spending. NYPD uniformed overtime is projected to reach $890 million in FY 2026, still approximately $287 million above the FY 2013–FY 2023 average of $603 million. In FY 2025, approximately 70.8% of overtime spending was outside precinct-attributable spending, which suggests it was not directly tied to ordinary precinct-level patrol overtime, and instead spent on specialized units, details, planned deployments, and other non-precinct functions.

The gap between adopted overtime budgets and actual spending further shows that elevated NYPD overtime has become a recurring budget problem, not a one-year anomaly. NYPD overtime costs were overspent by an average of 53% from FY 2013 to FY 2025, while the last three completed fiscal years ranged from 101% to 121% above adopted levels. Prior to the most recent Executive Budget, the City was budgeting for overtime at adoption, at levels that had not been realized in practice for years, then absorbing large overruns after the fact. That approach weakened transparency and fiscal planning, limited the usefulness of the adopted budget as a planning document, and made it harder to assess whether NYPD’s control measures were reducing reliance on overtime at the scale the fiscal year results require. Best-practice oversight models treat repeated overtime overruns as an opportunity for formal corrective action planning. For example, the City of Chicago’s Office of Inspector General conducted an audit of Chicago Police Department overtime controls focused on whether the department effectively managed overtime to prevent waste and abuse, and later issued a follow-up inquiry tracking whether corrective actions were fully, partially, or not implemented.[10] NYPD’s thresholds and documentation requirements are a step toward oversight, but FY 2025 results indicate the City needs formal, written escalation mechanisms when commands repeatedly exceed limits.

Best practice audits in other jurisdictions also emphasize that overtime compliance works best when it is centralized, auditable, and tied to measurable outcomes rather than dispersed as a purely command-level responsibility. San Diego’s City Auditor, for example, has highlighted the value of centralized overtime management and priority frameworks that require clear justification for overtime assignments.[11] FY 2025 outcomes support formalizing NYPD’s compliance function so it can be independently assessed and can drive consistent reductions.

NYPD’s $960 million in uniformed overtime spending in FY 2025 was approximately equal to the combined overtime spending of all the other uniformed agencies

Figure 3: Uniformed Overtime Costs, FY 2013-2026

Source: Office of the New York City Comptroller, Mayor’s Office of Management and Budget

The agency-by-agency overtime breakdown for the four major uniformed agencies in figure 3 shows that overtime is not an isolated issue within a single department. Across the City’s four major uniformed agencies, uniformed overtime spending remained extremely high in FY 2025: $960 million for NYPD, $478 million for FDNY, $307 million for DOC, and $179 million for DSNY, totaling approximately $1.924 billion across these agencies. FY 2026 projections remain similarly elevated, with projected overtime of approximately $890 million for NYPD, $452 million for FDNY, $334 million for DOC, and $275 million for DSNY, totaling approximately $1.951 billion across the four agencies. This scale indicates that overtime is functioning as a recurring operating cost rather than an occasional backstop for emergencies or unforeseeable events, and it raises concerns about whether baseline staffing, scheduling, and internal controls are adequate to prevent predictable overtime usage.

Within that citywide total, NYPD is the central driver. In FY 2025, NYPD’s overtime spending was nearly equal to the combined overtime spending of the other three agencies: FDNY, DOC, and DSNY together totaled $964 million, only $4 million more than NYPD alone. The FY 2026 projection shows the same basic pattern: NYPD is projected to spend $890 million in uniformed overtime, nearly equal to the combined projected overtime spending of FDNY, DOC, and DSNY, which together total approximately $1.061 billion. Although NYPD also employs more than half of the City’s uniformed staff across these four agencies, the scale of NYPD’s overtime makes it the City’s largest opportunity to reduce uniformed overtime costs through stronger management controls, especially because changes in NYPD overtime practices can have a larger budgetary impact than changes at any other single uniformed agency.

Overtime is concentrated in foreseeable deployments, including expanded quality-of-life initiatives.

Figure 4: NYPD Uniformed Event/Details Overtime by Subcategory (October–December 2025)

Source: Office of the Comptroller analysis of NYPD FY 2025 quarterly overtime reports

Note: Figures reflect NYPD-reported Event/Details overtime spending for October through December 2025, as reflected in the source data used for this table. NYPD quarterly overtime figures may be updated in subsequent reporting, and totals may differ slightly across NYPD reports due to later revisions or differences in reporting format.

Figure 4 shows the most recent Event/Details overtime data analyzed for this report, covering October through December 2025. In that quarter, NYPD reported a total of $45,932,306 in uniformed Event/Details overtime across 578,231 hours. Within the Event/Details category, NYPD divides overtime into three subcategories: Details, Planned Events, and Unplanned Events. In October through December 2025, Planned Events drove the majority of Event/Details overtime, totaling approximately $26.4 million and 341,842 hours, or approximately 58% of Event/Details overtime spending and 59% of Event/Details overtime hours for the quarter. Other recurring deployments reinforce the same point. Other recurring deployments reinforce the same point. Subway safety overtime totaled $151 million in FY 2023, $144 million in FY 2024, and $161 million in FY 2025, making it another major recurring driver of NYPD overtime. Some subway safety overtime may be reimbursed by the State, which can reduce the net fiscal impact on the City. However, reimbursement does not change the operational point: these deployments still require NYPD staffing, generate substantial overtime, and should be subject to staffing plans, scheduling discipline, and ongoing performance review.

While some overtime may be unavoidable due to unexpected public safety needs, NYPD’s Event/Details breakdown indicates that a large share of overtime in this category is concentrated in foreseeable deployments. Those deployments should be a priority for enforceable management controls because they can often be planned, scheduled, and staffed in advance, even if the precise staffing needs may vary. The issue is not whether NYPD should staff major public safety needs, but whether foreseeable deployments are planned, scheduled, documented, and reviewed in a way that minimizes avoidable overtime while preserving necessary coverage.

When foreseeable deployments become a primary overtime driver, it can indicate that overtime is being used as a routine staffing approach for deployments NYPD can anticipate and schedule, rather than as a backstop for genuinely unplanned needs or operationally necessary coverage.

NYPD’s overtime documentation describes Planned Events as including “Parades, street fairs, quality-of-life initiatives, and sport/entertainment events,” suggesting that at least some Planned Events overtime reflect deliberate operational choices rather than unpredictable emergencies. Unlike many unplanned events, quality-of-life enforcement is a discretionary strategy choice that can be shaped through how deployments are planned, how tours are scheduled, and whether work is appropriately routed to non-police responders and partner agencies where feasible. Since NYPD’s public data does not disaggregate “quality of life initiatives” within Planned Events, this report does not estimate the share attributable to quality-of-life activity. Instead, it identifies Planned Events as a priority control target because it is a largely foreseeable category that NYPD itself defines to include quality-of-life initiatives.[iii] [12]

Further, Figure 4 shows that within Planned Events, “All Other Planned Events” was the largest single driver, at $24.09 million and 281,823 hours, representing approximately 33% of the quarter’s total Event/Details overtime spending. Parades were also substantial, at $15.40 million and 198,168 hours, followed by Entertainment at $10.26 million and 118,141 hours, and Street Fairs/Festivals at $1.31 million and 16,294 hours. By contrast, Unplanned Events totaled $10.84 million and 139,930 hours for the quarter, including $5.72 million for Presidential and Dignitary Visits, $1.36 million for Protests and Demonstrations, and $3.76 million for All Other Unplanned Events.

Finally, Figure 4 shows a large Details subcategory totaling $11.45 million and 132,492 hours. Together, Planned Events and Details accounted for $37.89 million and 474,334 hours, or approximately 82% of Event/Details spending and 82% of Event/Details hours in October–December 2025. This reinforces that the vast majority of Event/Details overtime was concentrated in Planned Events and Details, not truly unexpected events.

Figure 5: NYPD Uniformed Event/Details Overtime, Planned Events Subcategory, Monthly Spending (FY 2023–FY 2025, $ Millions)

Source: Office of the NYC Comptroller analysis of NYPD FY 2025 quarterly overtime reports

Note: Figures reflect NYPD-reported Planned Events overtime spending by month. NYPD quarterly overtime figures may be updated in subsequent reporting.

Figure 5 further details the Planned Events subcategory within NYPD’s uniformed Event/Details overtime category, using monthly spending figures reported in NYPD’s FY 2025 quarterly overtime submissions. The annual trend shows that Planned Events overtime increased from $97.1 million in FY 2023 to $110.4 million in FY 2024 and $115.7 million in FY 2025. The timing of this overtime also supports the report’s foreseeability finding. This recurring pattern strengthens the case for standard staffing templates, pre-event coverage plans, and tighter approval thresholds that treat overtime as an exception rather than the default staffing approach for foreseeable deployments.

As NYPD defines Planned Events to include “quality of life initiatives,” the rise and persistence of overtime in this subcategory strengthens the case for scrutinizing whether discretionary quality-of-life deployments are being staffed in ways that routinely generate overtime and whether the City is using the most appropriate response model for non-criminal, non-dangerous conditions where feasible. Taken together, NYPD’s reported Planned Events overtime data point to a persistent, management-addressable overtime driver concentrated in foreseeable deployments.

Recommendations

The analysis above indicates that NYPD overtime has been elevated in recent years, is heavily concentrated in foreseeable deployments, and is not explained by headcount alone. NYPD has already described steps intended to strengthen overtime governance, including its January 1, 2025, overtime plan with thresholds, documentation requirements, and command-level compliance roles, as well as routine monitoring practices described in the Department’s Annual Overtime Control Plan.

However, FY 2026 projections and year-to-date results, along with oversight findings, indicate these measures have not been sufficient to change outcomes at the scale the City needs. Because excessive overtime is also an operational safety risk, the recommendations include a fatigue-risk management component aligned with OIG-NYPD’s findings on officer fatigue safeguards and the association between high overtime hours and negative policing outcomes. These recommendations specify auditable requirements, automatic escalation when limits are breached, fatigue-risk safeguards, and outcome-linked accountability mechanisms that can be independently verified. Informal discussions, threshold notices, or documentation of overtime after it occurs should not be treated as sufficient unless they produce written corrective actions, measurable reductions, and auditable evidence that the underlying operational driver was addressed.

Manage fatigue risk and prevent harm from excessive hours.

OIG-NYPD found that NYPD’s updated overtime policies “do not address mandatory time off, rest periods after long shifts or mandatory overtime, or provide guidance to commanding officers on methods of shift scheduling for purpose of mitigating officer fatigue.”[13] This is a critical omission because long work hours and extended shifts are a recognized safety risk that increases the likelihood of errors, injuries, and incidents and it also weakens overtime governance because it leaves high-hour outliers unmanaged.[14]  NYPD’s formal written policy should:

1. Establish minimum rest periods following extended tours and mandatory overtime, with documented exceptions.
2. Set maximum allowable consecutive hours and consecutive days with overtime, with enhanced approval for deviations.
3. Require quarterly reporting on rest-rule compliance, exceptions by command, and corrective actions for repeat noncompliance.

Strengthen command-level accountability for recurring overtime overages.

A threshold-and-documentation model can identify overages, but recurring overages require structured remediation, not repeated explanations. Other large-city police oversight models treat repeated overtime overruns as a cause for a written corrective action plans and follow-up monitoring. NYPD leadership has described internal steps to manage overtime more effectively, but the accountability mechanism should escalate when overages persist. NYPD’s formal written policy should:

4. Require a written corrective action plan within 30 days when a command exceeds thresholds for two consecutive quarters or in three quarters within a fiscal year, including root-cause analysis, specific operational changes, responsible personnel, and a timeline. The City already uses formal corrective-action-plan models in other contexts. For example, the NYC Board of Correction has required the NYC Department of Correction to submit a written Corrective Action Plan describing how it will come into compliance with Minimum Standards. NYPD’s Annual Overtime Control Plan also describes monthly monitoring and states that when overspending is identified, NYPD will seek a remediation plan. However, the plan does not establish automatic command-level triggers, a deadline for submitting a written corrective action plan, required plan components, or a process for publicly assessing whether the corrective action reduced recurring overtime.
5. Require written plans to identify which categories are driving overtime, such as planned events, arrests, investigations, training, and other drivers.
6. Publish whether each command met its reduction targets in the following two quarters.

Build an independent, auditable compliance and oversight function.

NYPD has described placing overtime compliance responsibilities at the command level.[15] While these roles may have some effectiveness, NYPD should formalize independence and auditability so compliance functions can be evaluated consistently and tied to measurable reductions. To ensure these roles function as true controls rather than procedural sign-offs, NYPD should strengthen independence and auditing. NYPD’s formal written policy should:

7. Establish a standardized audit protocol and require quarterly audits, conducted by personnel outside the command being audited, of a sample of overtime approvals and documentation across commands.
8. Formalize a repeat-overage escalation pathway that supplements existing command-level compliance monitoring by requiring written senior review and written corrective action when the same command repeatedly exceeds thresholds.
9. Publish an annual summary of audit findings (e.g., missing documentation, error rates, corrective actions), with command-level accountability.

Make overtime reporting timely, complete, and decision-useful.

New York City law requires NYPD to report overtime projections and categories quarterly, including planned events (parades, street fairs, sports/entertainment events), unplanned events, supplemental patrol, investigations, arrests, and training.[16] Beyond legal compliance, best-practice policy frameworks emphasize using overtime reporting to distinguish necessary from avoidable overtime and to drive command accountability. The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) has issued model policy resources intended to provide a structure for monitoring, managing, and controlling overtime.[17]  Therefore, NYPD’s formal written policy should:

10. NYPD should come into compliance with NYC Administrative Code § 14-150’s quarterly reporting timeline and post each quarterly report in a timely manner and keep postings current through the most recently completed quarter to enable meaningful oversight of drivers and reforms in near real time.
11. NYPD should adopt a standardized quarterly overtime reporting template that goes beyond the minimum information currently required. The template should include clear definitions for each overtime category, complete overtime hours and spending data, and recurring outlier tables that identify commands, units, categories, or operational drivers with unusually high overtime. NYPD should also publish both overtime hours and overtime spending by category and by major operational units so that the public, the City Council, and oversight bodies can better assess where overtime is concentrated and whether recurring overtime drivers are being addressed.
12. Include a recurring outlier section identifying the commands with the highest overtime, fastest growth, and repeated overage explanations.

Reduce predictable drivers of overtime

Planned events are scheduled in advance and therefore largely foreseeable, and they are specifically identified in the City’s quarterly overtime reporting framework. Because NYPD’s own framework includes quality-of-life initiatives within Planned Events, persistent overtime in this category can reflect recurring policy choices that should be planned, scheduled, and staffed without overtime as the default. Longstanding federal guidance from the Department of Justice’s National Institute of Justice emphasizes that concerns about overtime should be addressed through improved management techniques rather than accepting overtime growth as inevitable.[18]  NYPD’s formal written policy should:

13. Require written pre-event staffing plans and written post-event after-action reviews that prioritize scheduled coverage, compare planned staffing to actual overtime use, and document justification when overtime is used.
14. Track planned-event overtime as a distinct performance metric for commands and bureaus.
15. Identify recurring events that reliably generate overtime and redesign standard staffing templates to reduce overtime dependence.
16. On a quarterly basis identify posts, fixed assignments, and backfill practices that systematically generate overtime and redesign them with written measurable savings targets.

Reduce extreme overtime concentration among repeat outliers

NYPD has stated that the January 2025 approach reduced overtime performed by top overtime earners, but durable controls require clear, repeatable rules. NYPD should codify department-wide thresholds and required mitigation steps so reductions do not depend on informal discretion or temporary enforcement. Overtime control audits commonly focus on outliers and supervisory approval as core safeguards, because highly concentrated overtime can signal preventable scheduling failures, weak approvals, or elevated abuse risk. NYPD’s formal written policy should:

17. Codify and standardize NYPD’s existing individual overtime threshold-and-approval process, including defined quarterly thresholds, written operational justification for exceptions, and consistent review criteria across commands.
18. Require a documented mitigation plan for individual officers who repeatedly exceed overtime thresholds, such as rotation, schedule redesign, or staffing changes, rather than relying on recurring exceptions or approvals.

Conclusion

NYPD and City leadership have described steps intended to strengthen overtime governance, including the Department’s January 1, 2025, overtime plan with thresholds, documentation requirements, and command-level compliance roles. Those steps are meaningful, but FY 2025 results and FY 2026 projections and year-to-date spending show there remains work to do. Oversight findings also make clear that key safeguards remain missing. In a department where excessive overtime is both a fiscal risk and an operational risk, overtime controls that do not incorporate enforceable fatigue and scheduling safeguards leave core vulnerabilities unresolved.

To achieve durable reductions, NYPD will need reforms that treat overtime as a department-wide risk-control function. That means enforceable rest and recovery rules, escalation and corrective action for commands with repeated overages, an independent and auditable compliance function, timely and decision-useful reporting that supports real accountability, and proactive staffing strategies for predictable deployments so overtime is not the default. The recommendations in this report provide a practical framework to reduce overtime at fiscal-year scale, strengthen integrity and public trust, and align NYPD operations with fiscal reality and public safety.

Methodology

Overtime spending data was obtained from the New York City Financial Management System (FMS), and headcount data was sourced from the Office of the NYC Comptroller Office’s Agency Staffing Dashboard, which depicts the number of full-time actual employees provided by the Mayor’s Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in their Actual Full-Time Headcount report. Four related datasets were constructed to analyze overtime spending patterns across uniformed agencies and fiscal years.

For each fiscal year from 2013 through 2025, budgeted and actual overtime spending was recorded separately for civilian and uniformed employees and then aggregated to produce total annual overtime amounts, generating fiscal‑year totals for both the adopted budget and actual spending. Uniformed overtime spending was disaggregated by agency (NYPD, FDNY, DSNY, and DOC) and aggregated by fiscal year to track agency-specific trends. Police and Fire overtime spending were paired with annual headcounts to create a fiscal-year dataset linking total overtime costs to staffing levels. Percent overspending was calculated for each agency by dividing actual overtime spending by the adopted overtime budget, producing a fiscal‑year overspending rate.

Acknowledgments

This report was primarily authored by Justyn Richardson, Director of Criminal Justice and Public Safety Policy, with research and writing support provided by Jordan Stockdale, Deputy Comptroller for Policy; Jacob Bogitsh, Policy Data Analyst; Khalil Sulker, Strategic Organizer for Justice and Safety; Nedyah Alexis, Policy Analyst for Mental & Behavioral Health; Krista Olson, Deputy Comptroller for Budget; Rosa Charles, Senior Director of Labor Budget; Elizabeth Brown, Executive Director of Budget Oversight; and Kieran Persaud, Assistant Director of Budget Oversight. Report design was completed by Archer Hutchinson, Creative Director and Danbin Weng, Multimedia Designer.

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Footnotes

[i] This does not include potential impacts of the Knicks participating in the NBA championship games.

[ii] Other local police department agencies treat fatigue safeguards as a core overtime control, not a secondary workforce issue. For example, the Albuquerque Police Department’s fatigue management approach includes limits such as a maximum 16-hour workday and a weekly overtime cap, and Vancouver Police Department policies codify minimum rest rules and maximum consecutive hours, with limited exigency exceptions. NYPD’s current overtime controls, as assessed by OIG-NYPD, do not yet incorporate comparable enforceable rest and recovery standards.

[iii] In April 2025, then-Mayor Eric Adams and NYPD Commissioner Jessica Tisch announced a new “Quality of Life Division” for “quality-of-life concerns,” focusing on non-emergency conditions such as noise complaints, illegal parking, homelessness-related issues, outdoor drug use, and aggressive panhandling. In June 2025, then-Mayor Adams and NYPD Commissioner Tisch subsequently expanded the “Quality of Life Division” citywide to address “quality-of-life issues” and include all NYPD precincts across all five boroughs, indicating that quality-of-life enforcement was being elevated as an operational priority rather than treated as a limited pilot. In August 2025, then-Mayor Adams commended NYPD Commissioner Tisch for putting “this quality of life initiative, the Q-team, throughout our entire city.” To the extent Planned Events overtime includes staffing for quality-of-life initiatives of this kind, the driver is not unpredictability. It is how NYPD elects to staff foreseeable deployments, and whether alternative response models are used where appropriate. Sources, in order: City of New York, Office of the Mayor, “Mayor Adams, NYPD Commissioner Tisch Launch New Quality of Life Division to Enhance Public Safety,” April 10, 2025, https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2025/04/mayor-adams-nypd-commissioner-tisch-launch-new-quality-life-division-enhance-public-safety; City of New York, Office of the Mayor, “Mayor Adams, NYPD Commissioner Tisch Expand Quality of Life Division to Continue Enhancing Public Safety Across New York City,” June 16, 2025, https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2025/06/mayor-adams-nypd-commissioner-tisch-expand-quality-life-division-continue-enhancing-public; City of New York, Office of the Mayor, “Transcript: Mayor Adams and NYPD Commissioner Tisch Expand Quality of Life Teams Across Brooklyn,” August 4, 2025, https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2025/08/transcript–mayor-adams-and-nypd-commissioner-tisch-expand-quali.

Endnotes

[1] New York City Comptroller’s Office, Overtime Overview: A Deep Dive into NYPD Uniformed Overtime Costs, March 20, 2023, accessed May 23, 2026, https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/overtime-overview/

[2] New York City Department of Investigation, Office of the Inspector General for the New York City Police Department, Overtime Under Review: NYPD Overtime and the Increased Risk of Negative Policing Outcomes (New York: Department of Investigation, May 3, 2023), https://www.nyc.gov/assets/doi/press-releases/2023/May/21OIGNYPD.OT.Rpt.Release.05.03.2023.pdf

[3] New York City Administrative Code § 14-150, accessed February 12, 2026, https://codelibrary.amlegal.com/codes/newyorkcity/latest/NYCadmin/0-0-0-25085

[4] City of New York, Office of the Mayor, Mayoral Directive 2024-1: Overtime Spending (December 23, 2024), PDF, https://www.nyc.gov/content/dam/nycgov/mayors-office/downloads/pdf/directives/2024/mayoral-directive-2024-01.pdf (accessed February 16, 2026)

[5] Office of the New York City Comptroller Brad Lander, The State of the City’s Economy and Finances (New York: Office of the New York City Comptroller, December 15, 2025), https://comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-content/uploads/documents/The-State-of-the-Citys-Economy-and-Finances_2025.pdf

[6] Maria Cramer and Chelsia Rose Marcius, “N.Y.P.D.’s Top Uniformed Officer Resigns Amid Sexual Misconduct Allegations,” New York Times, December 21, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/21/nyregion/jeffrey-maddrey-nypd-resigns.html

[7] New York City Council, Committee on Public Safety, “Strategies to Reduce NYPD Overtime Expenditures,” hearing video, March 11, 2025, City Meetings NYC, https://citymeetings.nyc/meetings/new-york-city-council/2025-03-11-0930-am-committee-on-public-safety/chapter/strategies-to-reduce-nypd-overtime-expenditures/

[8] New York City Department of Investigation, Office of the Inspector General for the New York City Police Department (OIG-NYPD), Eleventh Annual Report (April 2025), 25, https://www.nyc.gov/assets/doi/reports/pdf/2025/17OIGNYPDARRelease.Rpt.04.01.2025.pdf (accessed February 16, 2026)

[9] New York City Department of Investigation, Office of the Inspector General for the New York City Police Department, Twelfth Annual Report (New York: New York City Department of Investigation, April 2026), https://www.nyc.gov/assets/doi/reports/pdf/2026/08OIGNYPD.AR.Release.Rpt.04.15.2026.pdf (accessed May 19, 2026).

[10] City of Chicago Office of Inspector General, Audit of the Chicago Police Department’s Overtime Controls (Chicago: City of Chicago Office of Inspector General, October 3, 2017), https://igchicago.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/CPD-Overtime-Controls-Audit.pdf; City of Chicago Office of Inspector General, Chicago Police Department Overtime Controls Audit Follow-Up Inquiry (Chicago: City of Chicago Office of Inspector General, February 3, 2020), https://igchicago.org/publications/chicago-police-department-overtime-controls-audit-follow-up-inquiry/

[11] Office of the City Auditor, City of San Diego, Performance Audit of the San Diego Police Department’s Overtime (San Diego: Office of the City Auditor, February 2024), https://www.sandiego.gov/sites/default/files/2024-02/24-08_performance_audit_sdpd_ot.pdf.

[12] New York City Office of the Mayor, “Transcript: Mayor Adams and NYPD Commissioner Tisch Expand Quality of Life Teams Across All of Brooklyn Following Successful Pilot Launch,” August 4, 2025, https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2025/08/transcript–mayor-adams-and-nypd-commissioner-tisch-expand-quali.

[13] New York City Department of Investigation, Office of the Inspector General for the New York City Police Department (OIG-NYPD), Eleventh Annual Report (April 2025), 25, https://www.nyc.gov/assets/doi/reports/pdf/2025/17OIGNYPDARRelease.Rpt.04.01.2025.pdf (accessed February 16, 2026)

[14] Occupational Safety and Health Administration, “Worker Fatigue: Hazards of Fatigue,” accessed February 12, 2026, https://www.osha.gov/worker-fatigue/hazards.

[15] New York City Council, Committee on Public Safety, “Strategies to Reduce NYPD Overtime Expenditures,” hearing video, March 11, 2025, City Meetings NYC, https://citymeetings.nyc/meetings/new-york-city-council/2025-03-11-0930-am-committee-on-public-safety/chapter/strategies-to-reduce-nypd-overtime-expenditures/.

[16] New York City Administrative Code § 14-150, accessed February 12, 2026, https://codelibrary.amlegal.com/codes/newyorkcity/latest/NYCadmin/0-0-0-25085.

[17] International Association of Chiefs of Police, “Overtime,” accessed February 12, 2026, https://www.theiacp.org/resources/policy-center-resource/overtime

[18] David H. Bayley and Robert E. Worden, Police Overtime: An Examination of Key Issues (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice, May 1998), https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles/167572.pdf