New York by the Numbers
Monthly Economic and Fiscal Outlook

A Message from the Comptroller

Dear New Yorkers,

Employment grew and inflation moderated slightly in New York City last month – a nice way to head into the holidays. Office occupancy and commuting numbers have held steady for several months, suggesting that we may be settling into a new normal. However, layoffs at several tech companies, declining Wall Street bonuses, and rising interest rates continue to portend challenges in the year ahead.

If we face a global economic downturn in the near term, as many economists predict, one area of economic activity that can provide a valuable, countercyclical boost is public infrastructure spending.

New York City’s infrastructure is a foundation for our shared thriving. City capital projects are the school buildings that educate our kids, the tunnels that bring us clean water, our public parks, libraries, and hospitals, affordable housing for families, the space and technology needed for our municipal government and courts, and the roads and bridges that New Yorkers rely on every day.

As our city grows and changes, so do the needs and strains on that infrastructure. Many of our bridges and sewer mains are over 100 years old. The affordable housing crisis (including the needs of NYCHA) calls for massive investments. The rising seas and temperatures of the climate crisis require new flood protections, building transformations, and renewable energy infrastructure.

This month’s newsletter includes a look at two key elements of that work: How we pay for our capital projects, and how we manage them. Earlier this month, our office released the “Annual Report on Capital Debt and Obligations.” While we must make the best possible use of federal Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act and NYS Environmental Bond Act funds (more on that in the coming months), the vast majority of the funding for our infrastructure will come through the City of New York’s debt financing.

So you’ll be pleased – and perhaps even somewhat surprised – to learn that by key measures, the City’s debt burden is at its lowest level in the past 20 years. After reaching a high of 17.2% in FY 2002, the City’s debt service as a percent of local tax revenues has dropped to 9.7% in FY 2022.

Some of that is because of the low interest rates of the past decade, and some due to the fact that tax revenues and property values have grown faster than our capital expenditures. But unfortunately, some of it is because we aren’t very good at executing those capital projects.

Our spotlight this month uses a database our office has assembled of nearly 10,000 completed and ongoing capital projects to help evaluate capital spending. It probably won’t surprise you to learn that 63.8% of completed projects experienced either delayed starts and/or took longer than planned; and 45.1% of ongoing projects are already taking longer than planned. In addition, 33% of completed projects – and 45.8% of ongoing projects – have come in over budget.

The good news is efforts are underway to improve New York City’s capital projects management. The NYC Capital Process Reform Task Force (which our office is enthusiastically participating in), and the Department of Design and Construction’s Blueprint 2022 take direct aim at this need and are off to promising starts. Both of these efforts were launched by outgoing First Deputy Mayor Lorraine Grillo, a champion for capital process reform.

We also need better infrastructure planning to guide spending and prioritize projects. There is currently no comprehensive, accurate, regularly-updated inventory of the City’s infrastructure – including what it would really cost to bring it into a “state of good repair” and where the biggest vulnerabilities lie. And in the face of rising seas and temperatures, the City will also need to develop a risk-based framework to guide long-term resiliency investments.

If we can do the hard work to plan more strategically, finance projects wisely, maximize state and federal dollars, and execute projects more efficiently, we can build the platform for New York City to thrive for years to come.

And especially if we can strengthen our workforce development system, those construction jobs can help create a more inclusive economy, and offer many low-income and immigrant New Yorkers a pathway to the middle class, as they have for generations.

That is an investment with good short- and long-term returns.

Have a great holiday season, and we’ll keep watching the numbers,

The Fiscal Year 2023 Annual Report on Capital Debt & Obligations

Each year, the Comptroller is required to report the amount of debt the City may incur for capital projects and assess the current state of the City’s debt burden compared to its tax base and statutory debt limit.

Debt for the City, excluding that of the New York City Municipal Water Finance Authority, has grown from $39.55 billion in FY 2000 to $95.27 billion in FY 2022, an increase of 141%. Over the same period, New York City personal income grew by 136%, New York City local tax revenues by 205%, and the City-funds expense budget by 184%.

By several measures, the City’s relative debt burden has improved over the past two decades. Debt service as a percentage of local tax revenues dropped from 17.2% in FY 2002 to 9.7% in FY 2022 (and is well below the 15% threshold often identified as a guardrail for affordability). Debt outstanding as a percentage of taxable assessed property values decreased from an average of 41.7% over FY 2002 to FY 2021 to 36.6% in FY 2022. Debt as a percentage of property market values was 3.4% in FY 2021, using a sales-based valuation of real estate.

The City’s outstanding debt and contract liability continue to remain well under the statutory debt limit throughout the four years of the city’s financial plan. The City’s debt ceiling, which is defined by the State constitution as 10% of the five-year rolling average of the full value of taxable City real property, is currently $127.45 billion. Current outstanding debt, which counts toward that debt-limit totals $85.94 billion as of July 1, 2022, leaving the City with a debt-incurring power of $41.51 billion.

The City’s credit rating remains strong. In Fiscal Year 2022, Moody’s Investors Service maintained the City’s GO bond rating at Aa2. Standard and Poor’s Global Ratings (S&P) maintained its rating of the City’s GO bonds at AA. Fitch Ratings (Fitch) maintained its rating of GO bonds at AA- and changed its outlook to positive. In Fiscal Year 2022, the City’s GO bonds received a rating of AA+ from Kroll Bond Rating Agency (Kroll). Rating agencies cite the City’s large and diverse economy, strong financial management and legal frameworks, and liquidity among positive credit attributes that support strong ratings.

The full report can be found here.

Spotlight

New York City’s Capital Financial Planning, 2008 to the Present

Capital financial planning – the process by which the City budgets for capital projects across years – is a crucial component of providing and maintaining NYC’s public works (parks, schools, roads & bridges, libraries, affordable housing, public hospitals, water infrastructure, and more). As we face a potential economic downturn, rising interest rates, aging infrastructure, and increasing resiliency needs, it is imperative that the City manage its capital dollars wisely and improve the process of planning and executing projects.

Yet over the past decade, the City has struggled to meet its own capital project timelines. Every fiscal year, the City releases a capital program that anticipates billions of dollars in spending, but then falls well short of its own projections. Within the last ten years, the City has hit no more than 75% of its capital target, and some years has been below 50% (Chart S.1).

Chart S.1

Note: The above chart reflects FMS 2 data and differs from OMB commitment actuals as it does not include OMB “proprietary adjustments.” One of the low points (47.6% in 2020) was due to slowed spending during the COVID-19 pandemic.

In this month’s spotlight, we use a new dataset, assembled by the Comptroller’s office, consisting of the City’s capital plans from 2004 to the present that links individual projects through capital plans over time. This dataset allows us to 1) compare budgets against actual spending, and 2) analyze the timing of project starts and delivery.

This analysis is part of a broader wave of efforts – including the City’s anticipated launch of a comprehensive and publicly accessible capital project tracker in the spring of 2023, as mandated by Local Law 37 of 2020, sponsored by the Comptroller when he was a Council Member, and which is being implemented as part of the NYC Capital Process Reform Task Force initiated by outgoing First Deputy Mayor Lorraine Grillo – aimed at improving the transparency of New York City’s capital initiatives. The analysis produced here is constrained by the limited information currently available on the capital budget. A better understanding of problems, delays, and funding gaps will be made possible over time by the additional information required at the project level by Local Law 37.

Background

Unlike the City’s operating budget – funded largely through taxes and state and federal grants – the capital budget is primarily funded through a municipal bond program (mainly General Obligation, Transitional Finance Authority, and New York Municipal Water Authority bonds) that allows the City to fund capital projects and pay off their debt over time. The costs return to the operating budget as debt service payments, which are made from the City’s operating funds.

The capital budget includes physical project improvements that typically cost at least $50,000 and last for at least five years.[1] Not all capital work is the development of new infrastructure – many initiatives focus on large scale repair and restoration processes that essentially reset the clock on how many useful years an asset can last, as well as the purchase of equipment and vehicles used by the City.[2]

While the City publishes a broad Ten-Year Capital Commitment Plan every two years, more detailed information about capital projects is provided as part of the Four-Year Financial Plan, consistent with the operating budget and financial plan.

Project Analysis

Over the past 8 years the Comptroller’s Office has tracked these capital plans, as well as commitments and liquidations, to observe the City’s performance on capital project delivery. Utilizing these data, we created a proprietary database to observe capital projects through Project IDs (the unique identification system the City uses for each capital project), as organized in the City’s Financial Management System (FMS). A detailed explanation of this dataset and its limitations is included in the endnotes.[3]

Below is a distribution of 9,682 projects with committed funding since 2008 included in this analysis, by agency:

Chart S.2

Note: The Other category consists of the Administration for Children’s Services, the Department for the Aging, Research Libraries, a small contingent of Department of Education projects, NYC Transit, and Juvenile Justice (which was moved into ACS in 2010).

While the projects included in this analysis roll up to many agencies across the City, 52.7% of the projects are under just four agencies: Department of Parks and Recreation, Department of Citywide Administrative Services, Department of Environmental Protection, and the Department of Transportation. Many of these projects are overseen by managing agencies different than the agencies that fund them, such as the Department of Design and Construction (DDC) and the City’s Economic Development Corporation (EDC). This analysis reflects which agency funded the capital project, rather than which one managed it. However, it is essential that the tracker mandated by Local Law 37 include managing agency performance as well.

Capital Planning Performance

Project Start Delays

We compared planned first commitments to actual first commitments to determine if projects started according to plan.

Across program agencies, 45.2% of projects started on time (4,650 projects), 42.4% of projects started one to two years delayed (4,369 projects), 8.7% three to four years delayed (895 projects), 1.8% five to six years delayed (184 projects), and 0.7% delayed by seven or more years after their planned start date (68 projects). Cultural and library projects were disproportionately likely to start late, possibly reflecting that it took several years to assemble the full City capital funds needed (i.e. they were only awarded partial funding in the first year). DOITT projects were more likely to start on time, presumably reflecting that they were equipment purchase and software projects, rather than construction.

Chart S.3

Project Durations

Next, we sought to compare planned and actual project durations. We used the number of fiscal years that the capital plan showed dollar commitments to approximate project length or duration. Similarly, the number of years with actual commitments was used as the proxy for actual project duration.

From 2008 to the present, the City’s capital plans have unrealistically indicated that commitments on 88.9% of new projects would be completed within one fiscal year.

We compared the planned vs actual duration for completed projects by placing projects into the following categories:

*Because the plans only provide timelines at the level of an entire fiscal year, when a project could take 12 months but cross two fiscal years, any project that was completed within the same or one additional year was considered completed “as planned.”

Completed Projects

Nearly three quarters of projects (72.6%) were completed within the planned timeframe. More than a quarter of projects took longer than initially planned (27.4%). Observing preliminary data for ongoing projects (vs. completed ones), a much larger proportion (45.1%) of these projects – which are by definition not yet complete – are already taking longer than their planned durations.

Double Delays

Some projects experience both start delays as well as duration extensions.

The table below presents the percentage of overall completed projects by cost tier that fall into each of the categories:

Project Starts and Durations by Cost Tier for Completed Projects (%)

Of the projects we observed, only 35.4% both started on time and took as long as initially planned. 63.8% of projects were not completed on time due to delayed starts, longer than anticipated schedule durations, or both.

Project Costs

In order to understand the relationship between planned project costs and actual project costs, initial budget estimates (the amount initially included in the Commitment Plan the first time a project was introduced) were compared to total actual commitments to see if a project ran over budget. Overall, 33% of completed projects from 2008 to the present ran over their projected budget. Projects were again separated into cost tiers to observe variations in performance.

Chart S.4

Although the lowest cost projects were least likely to run over budget, the percentage did not vary much across categories, ranging from 29.6% for projects under $500,000 and peaking at 36% for projects between $1 million and $5 million. The $500,000 and under category includes many equipment acquisitions and other projects that typically have a much more straightforward progression.

Ongoing projects show a greater percentage of projects currently over budget (vs. completed projects) when comparing their initial budget estimates to their current total actual commitments. Overall, 45.8% of ongoing capital projects are over budget.

96.6% percent of projects involve only one programming agency, but the remaining 3.4% of projects are affiliated with multiple programming agencies. In this category, 62.6% of projects came in over budget.

Compounding:  Budgets and Schedules

The last part of our analysis ties together start delays and duration extensions with project budget performance for completed projects. Perhaps unsurprisingly, 84% of projects that came in on time also came in on budget. Delayed starts were less correlated with cost overruns than longer durations – which also makes sense, as elongated project durations extend the amount of time crews are onsite, equipment is utilized, assets are unavailable, and so on. The worst offenders were projects that both delayed their starts and took longer than anticipated, coming in over budget 63.3% of the time.

Conclusion

The City’s latest capital plan included $79.97 billion of planned capital spending over the next four fiscal years. Based on historical performance, we can expect only $67 billion of the plan to be committed within that timeframe, due to project delays.  A system in which nearly two-thirds of completed projects aren’t on time – and more than a third are over budget – is certainly in need of reform.

Fortunately, efforts to improve the City’s capital planning and procurement process have begun. The City’s Department of Design and Construction, which is responsible for a substantial share of construction for DOT, DEP, Parks, libraries, and other agencies, continues to implement its Blueprint to improve capital project delivery (e.g. piloting the use of “Design-Build” and other new procurement methods). The Capital Process Reform Task Force, convened by outgoing First Deputy Mayor Lorraine Grillo, has laid out and begun to implement additional recommendations to improve the project pipeline, streamline approvals, manage projects more effectively, reform procurement, and grow the number of New Yorkers who can participate.

As noted above, this work includes the creation of a uniform Capital Project Tracker required by Local Law 37, which will augment and improve on the data collected by this Office and utilized in this report, making it accessible to all and helping the City to identify and address common challenges to keeping projects on-time and on-budget.

With capital becoming more expensive, and fiscal constraints looming, careful financial planning is but one necessary step to make sure the City can afford to maintain its complicated yet integral infrastructure in the coming years.

Prepared by:  Peter Flynn, Krzysztof Haranczyk, and Kieran Persaud

The U.S. Economy

• Steady U.S. employment growth continued in November, despite rising interest rates, as nonfarm payroll employment increased by 263,000 following an increase of 261,000 in October and 263,000 in September.
• The U.S. seasonally adjusted unemployment rate was unchanged at 3.7% in November.
• Average hourly earnings continued to accelerate in November, rising 18 cents to $32.82, following a 10 cent rise in October.
• The November Consumer Price Index (CPI) for all items rose 7.1% from the previous year, down from 7.7% in October and 8.2% in September. It was the smallest annual CPI increase since December 2021.
• New York metropolitan area inflation continued its slow decline to an annual rate of 5.9% in November, down from 6.0% in October, and 6.2% in September.
• The Federal Reserve meets this week to deliberate on an expected 7^th increase in the targeted federal funds rate this year. Strong economic data such as employment growth suggest, based on prior statements by Fed Chairman Jerome Powell, that they believe more increases to be necessary to tame inflation. A 75 basis points increase would bring the targeted range to 4.50-4.75%.
• Real gross domestic product (GDP) growth was revised up to 2.9% in the 3^rd quarter of 2022, from a prior estimate of 2.6%, following decreases of 0.6% in the 2^nd quarter and 1.6% in the 1^st.

The NYC Economy

• County-level GDP estimates just released by the Bureau of Economic Analysis show New York City GDP grew by 6.0% in 2021, led by Manhattan (6.4%), Queens (6.1%), and Brooklyn (5.0%). GDP growth was slower in the Bronx (3.6%) and Staten Island (2.8%).
• GDP in Manhattan and Brooklyn surpassed pre-pandemic levels already in 2021, but GDP had not yet fully recovered for Staten Island, the Bronx, and Queens, where GDP suffered a 10.0% pandemic decline in 2020 (Chart 1). 2022 figures will be available in December 2023.

Chart 1

SOURCE: Bureau of Economic Analysis

Labor Markets

• Seasonally adjusted New York City private employment increased by roughly 13,000 in October to 3.991 million, or about 97.2% of the pre-pandemic peak.
• New York City employment in Food Services and Hospitality increased by almost 10,000 jobs (3%) in October, the largest increase of any sector, followed by health care, and the arts and entertainment.
• Despite these increases, employment in food and hospitality remains over 50,000 (13.7%) below the pre-pandemic highs, and employment in arts, entertainment, and recreation remains over 9,000 (9.8%) below.

Table 1: Seasonally Adjusted NYC Private Employment, by Industry (‘000s)

SOURCE: NYS DOL, and NYC Office of the Comptroller. Due to revisions to earlier months, numbers may not match to previous monthly newsletters

• New York City’s seasonally adjusted unemployment rate edged up to 5.9% in October, from 5.6% in September (Chart 2).
• Unemployment rates for Black (7.7%) and Hispanic (8.9%) New Yorkers remain above the citywide rate. Small sample sizes for the Current Population Survey make it difficult to interpret short-term unemployment fluctuations for racial and ethnic subgroups.

Chart 2

SOURCE: Seasonally adjusted citywide rate from NYS DOL, by race/ethnicity from the Current Population Survey

• Employers in New York State are required to provide early notice of closures and layoffs to all affected employees. While initial unemployment claims provide a better picture of labor market conditions in real time, recently announced layoffs in NYC are concentrated in tech/media, blockchain and COVID testing (Table 2).
• Per Table 1 above, jobs in information technology overall were flat in October (up approximately 700, or 0.2%), after growth through the pandemic has led to overall increases of 14,400 (6.3%) from pre-pandemic levels.

Table 2: NYC Area WARN Notices

SOURCE: NY Department of Labor, WARN database, https://dol.ny.gov/warn-notices.

Housing Market

• Streeteasy data shows median New York City asking rents held steady at $3,500 in October, unchanged for the 5^th consecutive month apart from a transitory bump in August (Chart 3). Asking rents remain up 20% from pre-pandemic levels, and up 40% from pandemic lows.
• The number of listed apartments available for rent fell to 29,036 in October, down from 30,612 in September and 33,987 in August.

Chart 3

SOURCE: Streeteasy.com

• Borough level data on rents from Zillow shows October rents dipping from record highs in Manhattan and Brooklyn, but hitting all-time highs in Queens, Staten Island and the Bronx (Chart 4).

Chart 4

SOURCE: Zillow Observed Rental Index, not seasonally adjusted, mean listed rents in the 40^th to 60^th percentile of homes weighted to reflect the rental housing stock

• New York City’s homeless shelter population increased by nearly 1,000 individuals over the month of November, and by 17,897 from June 1st to November 30th (Chart 5). The Department of Homeless Services recently recorded an all-time high of 64,222 individuals in shelter on December 4, 2022.
• The City’s average monthly shelter population rose 10.8% in October, 9.9% in September, 6.1% in August, 4.0% in July and 1.6% in November. Much of the increase prior to November has been attributed to the arrival of thousands of asylum seekers from South America, who after crossing the U.S. southern border have been bussed to New York City. The number of buses arriving in New York City slowed appreciably in recent weeks after a change in U.S. policy. However, that policy is now under a Federal judge’s order to end on December 21^st, suggesting much is unknown about these trends.[4]
• The City has estimated that some 30,300 asylum seekers have arrived in New York City in recent months, many of who are staying in City shelters and the City’s Humanitarian Emergency Response and Relief Centers (HERRCs).

Chart 5

SOURCE: NYC DHS, via NYC Open Data

Business and Real Estate

• 3^rd quarter profits on Wall Street were $5.78 billion, unchanged from the 2^nd quarter of 2022 but well down from $13.9 billion in the 3^rd quarter of 2021 (Chart 6). Profits have been impacted by a slumping stock market and higher borrowing costs.

Chart 6

SOURCE: Intercontinental Exchange, pre-tax profits of member firms doing business with the public

• New York City office space available for lease rose to 125 million square feet as of early December, up slightly from 123 million in the 3^rd quarter of 2022 (Chart 7).
• Average rents held steady at about $66 per square foot, where they have been since early 2021.

Chart 7

SOURCE: CoStar

• Security card data from Kastle show New York City area office occupancy bounced back from Thanksgiving week to 48% of pre-pandemic levels, tied with Chicago to lead the pack of U.S. cities outside Texas (Chart 8).
• Compared to pre-pandemic levels, office occupancy in is highest in the Texas cities of Austin (65%), Houston (60%) and Dallas (53%).

Chart 8

SOURCE: Kastle

• Overall availability of Manhattan retail space fell in the 3^rd quarter of 2022 according to data from Cushman and Wakefield. Availability rose to 28.7% on Lower Fifth Avenue, was unchanged in three Manhattan retail corridors and fell in the remaining eight corridors tracked by Cushman and Wakefield (Chart 9).
• Retail availability fell most dramatically on the Upper West Side, to 12.9% in the 3^rd quarter, from 16.7% in the 2^nd.

Chart 9

SOURCE: Cushman and Wakefield

Travel and Tourism

• October airport passenger volume at New York City area airports has almost fully recovered from the pandemic, with October travelers down just 2% from pre-pandemic levels (Chart 10).
• Overall, the City’s recovering air travel continues to outpace the nation. October air travel in the U.S. was down 5% from pre-pandemic levels.

Chart 10

SOURCE: TSA and Port Authority of New York and New Jersey

• International passenger travel at New York City area airports fell to 3.54 million in October, a decline of 95,000 from September, and down from 4.1 million in October 2019. However, the monthly decline was driven by seasonal factors, and only half the seasonal decline of October 2019, when passenger travel fell by over 200,000 (Chart 11).

Chart 11

SOURCE: Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, international revenue passengers

• Metro area transportation appears to have stabilized at a new normal, with bridge and tunnel traffic fully recovered at 100% of pre-pandemic levels, but public transit down by about a third (Chart 12). Subway ridership hit 3.9 million riders on Thursday, December 8^th, the highest day since the pandemic began.

Chart 12

SOURCE: MTA

City Finances

Personal Income Tax and NYC Pass-Through Entity Tax: Trends in 2022 and What to Expect in 2023

• New York City Personal Income Tax (PIT) collections reached a new peak of $16.7 billion in FY 2022 due to a combination of job growth, wage gains, strong bonuses, and high non-wage income earned in 2021.
• On a year-over-year basis, withholding revenues (which reflect PIT withheld on New York City paychecks) dropped between the second quarter of calendar year of 2020 and the first quarter of 2021 due to the pandemic and have been growing strongly since then (Table 3).
• In the current calendar year through November 2022, withholding grew 11.1%. Excluding the bonus season, 2022 withholding grew 9.9%, comparable to the pace of 10.1% established in 2021.

Table 3: Withholding Year-over-year Growth

SOURCE: Office of the NYC Comptroller.

• In contrast, 2022 estimated payments on non-wage income have declined due to the rise in interest rates and the associated declines in financial markets (Table 4).

Table 4: Installment Payments Amount and Year-over-year Growth

SOURCE: Office of the NYC Comptroller.

• Starting next year, PIT installment payments and final payments will be much more difficult to interpret because of a new tax created in 2022: the NYC Pass-Through Entity Tax (NYC-PTET).
• The tax is structured to be revenue neutral and provide a reduction in Federal individual income tax liability to NYC residents earning income from pass-through entities (e.g., partnerships and S-corporations). However, the new tax will scramble established, if volatile, collections patterns and introduce additional noise in forecasting. More details are available in the Comptroller’s report on the State of the City’s Economy and Finances, to be published later this week.

Cash Balances

• The City’s central treasury balance (funds available for expenditure) stood at $4.5 billion as of Tuesday, December 6^th, compared to $1.4 billion at the same time last year. The cash balance includes $1.954 billion in the Revenue Stabilization Fund (RSF), the City’s rainy-day fund. The majority of funds, $1.455 billion, were allocated to the RSF in fiscal year 2022.
• On Thursday, December 1^st, the cash balance measured close to $4 billion. It was likely the lowest cash balance of the fiscal year since the cash trough typically occurs the first week in December, but significantly higher than previous years. The seasonal low measured $1.338 billion in FY 2022, $2.143 billion in FY 2021, and $1.769 billion in FY 2020.
• The Comptroller’s Office’s review of the City’s cash position during the first quarter of FY 2023 and projections for cash balances through March 31, 2022, are available here.

Chart 13

SOURCE: Office of the NYC Comptroller

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Endnotes

[1] Capital eligibility standards may be found in the Comptroller’s Directive 10. A noted exception to the general five-year rule is the three-year minimum for technology related projects.: https://comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-content/uploads/documents/Directive_10-Charges-to-the-Capital-Projects-Fund-Final.pdf

[2] For a more detailed overview of the City’s capital budget, see the Independent Budget Office Guide to the Capital Budget: https://ibo.nyc.ny.us/iboreports/capital-budget-guide-2018.pdf

[3] Sample and definitions:

1. Projects were only considered for this analysis if their first actual commitments occurred in plans from January 2008 and onwards. Also, most Department of Education (DOE) projects are not included in the analysis as they are administered by the School Construction Authority (SCA).
2. SCA projects are excluded from the analysis as there is not yet appropriate data in our capital database for them. The SCA is a State public benefit corporation as described in Title 6 of the New York State Public Authorities Law – The New York City School Construction Authority Act. It produces separate capital plans that are outside the City’s FMS system. However, the City’s Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB’s) capital plan does include estimated commitments for the DOE as a proxy for the SCA’s Five-Year Educational Facilities Capital Plan, but it is not as detailed as the SCA’s capital plan. In addition, the manner in which the SCA updates its plan differs from other agencies within the City’s Capital Commitment Plan. The SCA establishes a five-year period, currently FY 2020-2024, and updates these fiscal years only, in contrast to the City’s continuous “rolling plan” approach that is released September, January, and April of each fiscal year.
3. Due to the lack of a clear delineation of project status, proxies were developed to assess the level of progress. Projects were defined as either ongoing (3,500 projects) or completed (6,622 projects) based on the ratio of liquidated expenditures to the sum of actual and planned commitments, as shown in the table below (yes, a project completion date, which will be provided as part of LL37, will make this much more straightforward):

Project Category	Number of Projects	Details
Completed	6,622	Ratio value of at least 95%; amount spent is at least 95% of actual commitments plus outstanding planned commitments.
Ongoing	3,500	Ratio value of 3% to 94.99%; amount spent is from 3% to 94.99% of actual commitments plus outstanding planned commitments.

Another subset of projects was classified as not yet started (4,715 projects), including amounts spent equivalent to less than 3% of actual commitments plus outstanding planned commitments. These were not included as a part of this analysis, which focuses on completed and ongoing projects. Projects with no commitments (Inactive, 6,338 projects) were also excluded.

4. Historically, the Comptroller’s Office was only provided four-year or five-year capital plans. Because access to the ten-year commitment plans at the Project ID level was not provided, any longer-term project timelines and budgets extending beyond the Four-Year plan could be arbitrarily truncated. However, the vast majority of projects (96.6%) were entered into the capital plan with only one to two year planned durations, suggesting that longer term planning was rare and that this was not a major limitation.
5. For the purpose of measuring performance against the initial Plan, we excluded a small number (4.3%) of projects that were included in the capital plan for the first time and had planned commitments in the final year of that capital plan. The final sample utilized for this analysis has 9,682 projects, of which 6,473 were completed and 3,209 are ongoing, representing $46.6 billion in initial planned commitments.

[4] https://www.npr.org/2022/12/08/1141499718/the-biden-administrations-appeal-on-the-title-42-ruling-revives-the-fight-on-asy

Sincerely,

Brad Lander